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Abstract 
As China’s economy grows, scholars of international relations increasingly ask what 
implications this growth will have on the World. One frequently asked question is how the 
relationship between the US and China will develop, as this relationship is believed to be of 
paramount importance for the future stability of East Asia. As theories of international 
relations - as well as of foreign policymaking - make different assumptions about the impact 
of public opinion on American foreign policies, they tend to arrive at quite different 
conclusions when attempting to predict the future of Sino-American relations. Accordingly, 
this thesis asks whether American public opinion does have an impact on American foreign 
policies towards China. After arguing that the theory of neoclassical realism can be used as a 
theoretical framework and a starting point for studying public opinion, I hypothesize that 
puclic opinion, Chinese policies and prior American policies towards China all contribute to 
American China-policies. Then, I go on to discuss how the analysis can overcome 
methodological challenges.  I thereby apply a simple, quantitative content analysis to obtain 
data for the public opinion (as perceived by policymakers). By using vector autoregressive 
models, I am able to model the relationship between the hypothesized factors statistically, in 
spite of endogeneity, finding that there is – indeed - a statistically significant impact of 
American public opinion on American foreign policies toward China. Furthermore, it is found 
that American policies are influenced by Chinese policies towards the US, as well as by prior 
policies towards China. 
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Public Opinion and American China Policy 
1.0 Introduction – The Rise and the Reaction 
Following the impressive growth of the Chinese economy out of the past decades, 
scholars and students from several disciplines within humanities and social science have 
dedicated much effort analyzing the consequences of a more powerful China. While authors 
from different schools seem to reach different conclusions about how “the Rise of China” 
may influence Sino-American relations (see Friedberg 2005), there seems to be an agreement 
that such an influence largely is dependent on two factors: Chinese intentions and the way the 
US responds to the Rise of China (Friedberg 2005, Kang 2007). 
This thesis focuses on analyzing what factors influence US policy toward China. 
Evaluating how USA will respond to what may be perceived as a challenger toward its 
“Unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1990), scholars have theorized how factors such as 
American interests, intentions and attitudes might influence Sino-American relations. For 
example, Gries, Crowson and Cai investigate how ideology may impact on “[…] American 
attitudes and policy preferences toward China” (Gries et al. 2011:1), assuming that American 
attitudes and American public opinion do influence US China policy. However, the 
assumption that American foreign policy is influenced by public opinion is contested, and 
there are arguments to be made that public opinion should have no significant impact on US 
China policy. Thus, the goal of my thesis will be to ascertain whether American public 
opinion influences American foreign policy toward China. 
 
1.1 Backdrop: The Fear of China – and the Rise of China 
Fearing that Eastern powers may come to threaten the West is not a new phenomenon: 
Napoleon is attributed as saying: “Quand la Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera”1, and by 
the end of the 19
th
 Century the phrase “The Yellow Peril” was used to denote the supposed 
threat of Oriental hordes swarming and invading the Western states. Later, during the 1970s, 
it was widely predicted that the 21
st
 century would belong to Japan, due to its rapid economic 
development and booming economy (see Time Magazine 1970). Today, the “Rise of China”-
debate concerns the implications of China’s economic growth since the early 1970s. From 
                                                          
1
 “When China awakens, the world will tremble.” 
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1978 to 2003, the annual economic growth amounted to 9.7%, and by 2010, China surpassed 
Japan as the second largest economy in the World (Kang 2007:12-13; Aftenposten 2011). 
 This economic growth has been a component in making China more influential 
politically, thereby fostering a debate on how the increased power of China will influence 
contemporary and future international relations. This is referred to as the debate on “the Rise 
of China.” The debate has largely focused on whether or not the Sino-American relationship, 
as well as China’s relations with other states, will be characterized by conflict or cooperation 
in the years to come. As Aaron L. Frieberg (2005) has shown in an article presenting the main 
views of the debate, realists, liberalist and constructivists disagree among themselves, and 
there is disagreement within each of the schools of thought. For example, most realists believe 
that the future of U.S.-Chinese relations will be characterized by conflict. Assuming that 
China’s economy will continue to grow, they also tend to assume that China will become 
more influential, politically as well as militarily. According to some, such as Samuel 
Huntington and John Mearsheimer, it is probable that, as Chinese power increases, China is 
likely to behave like other rising powers and “[…] challenge territorial boundaries, 
international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place 
when they were relatively weak”(Friedberg 2005:19). Other realist “pessimists” (as labeled by 
Friedberg), like Thomas J. Christensen (2004:64-68), claim that certain East Asian political 
characteristics, such as the situation of Taiwan, make East Asia prone to the dangers of the 
security dilemma. This means that there is no need to assume that China intents to displace 
the US as an East Asian hegemon in order to reach pessimistic conclusions about the Sino-
American relationship. Both China and the US may have largely defensive goals: China may 
only wish to make sure Taiwan does not declare formal independence, while the US may only 
want to make sure that China does not invade Taiwan. In order to make sure Taiwan does not 
declare independence, however, China will need to maintain an ability to invade Taiwan, 
which will challenge US ability to defend Taiwan. 
Some realists (see, among others, William C. Wohlforth 1999; Chambers 2002), 
however, have challenged the assumption that the Chinese economy is likely to continue to 
grow, and claim that Chinese power will remain limited. Others, among them Robert S. Ross 
(see Friedberg 2004:28-29), argue that the East Asian power structure is bipolar, and that, as a 
bipolar system, we should expect East Asian relations to be strained, but stable. For their part, 
most liberalists may see conflict as unlikely due to “[…] the pacifying power of three 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing causal mechanisms: economic interdependence, 
3 
 
international institutions, and democratization” (Friedberg 2005:12). However, Friedberg 
(2005:29-34) notes that future conflict may rise because of a democratic transition in China, 
during which aggressive nationalist rhetoric and actions are likely to dominate Chinese 
foreign policy, thus increasing the risk of international conflict. Moreover, the Chinese regime 
is currently authoritarian and is likely to remain authoritarian for the foreseeable future. 
Because of this, Friedberg (2005:29-34) argues that, from a liberalist perspective, one may 
claim that American public opinion may cause American foreign policy toward China to 
become more aggressive due to the current autocratic nature of the Chinese regime and the 
tendency of Americans to view autocratic regimes as “evil and illegitimate, and therefore [that 
they] cannot be trusted” (Friedberg 2005:32). 
Some constructivists, labeled “constructivist optimists” by Friedberg, view the future 
of Sino-American relations as peaceful. They support their argument by claiming “[…] 
China’s increasing participation in international institutions of various kinds will lead to shifts 
in its strategic culture, in the norms of international behavior accepted by its leaders, and 
ultimately in their conceptions of national identity” (Friedberg 2005:35). Others, labeled 
“Constructivist pessimists” worry that while American and Chinese perceptions of each other 
might not be hostile at the moment, increased interaction combined with unyielding positions 
over Taiwan and human rights will cause hostile images to become more prevalent (Friedberg 
2005:38). 
 Having clarified the main arguments of the “Rise of China” debate, it should be noted 
that the arguments presented above spring from different assumptions. While these 
assumptions should be well known to most students of international relations, and the most 
important of these are mentioned above, it should be pointed out that the theories above view 
the influence of public opinion differently. While the realist theories presented above do not 
view public opinion as an important factor, constructivists assert that the attitudes, beliefs and 
ideas held by the actors, such as public opinion, are important, and thereby assert that research 
on public opinion is of importance. Finally, some liberalists assert that American public 
opinion may influence American foreign policy to become more confrontational. The 
relationship between American public opinion and American foreign policy toward China has 
not been discussed extensively in contemporary literature. I therefore choose to focus on this 
relationship in my thesis. 
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1.2 Background – Studying the Impact of Public Opinion on American 
Foreign Policy 
The “Founding Fathers”, formulating the US Constitution, were doubtful of the ability of the 
public to make the best decisions for the United States as a whole: The public was seen as too 
fluctuating and too uninformed to master the complexities of foreign policy matters. 
According to one of the “Founding Fathers”, Alexander Hamilton, public opinion, and the 
institutional bodies elected by it, did not have the virtues needed: “[a]ccurate and 
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same 
views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch 
[…]” (Hamilton in Holsti 2004:6-7). Accordingly, the task of ratifying treaties was given to 
the Senate rather than the House of Representatives, as senators were, at the time, appointed 
by state legislatures rather than, as the representatives, elected by popular vote (Holsti 2004:6-
7). Moreover, and more importantly for the thesis, the president is pre-eminent in American 
foreign policymaking, commanding and directing the military, even though the power to 
declare war remains in Congress (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996:372-373). Thus, one might 
expect that American foreign policy should be exempt from the pressures and constraints of 
public opinion. 
In his book, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Ole Rudolf Holsti (2004) 
argues that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy has changed during the 20
th
 
Century. In the pre-Vietnam War era, researchers were hard pressed to find evidence that 
policymakers considered public opinion when formulating foreign policy: Even though most 
presidents and secretaries of state have made claims that public opinion is the basis for their 
policy, we cannot assume that such statements reflect actual policymaking. Moreover, when 
considering which candidates to vote for, election studies from the pre-Vietnam War era 
indicated that voters tended to care more about domestic issues than foreign policy issues. At 
the same time, when interviewed by researchers about the factors influencing their decisions 
related to foreign policy issues, policymakers tended to make few references to public opinion. 
However, such findings may be explained by policymakers anticipating “[…] public opinion 
without consciously considering it or [they] might have been reluctant to state that they were 
acting in response to public pressures, preferring instead to ascribe their actions to broader 
values such as ‘national interest’”(Holsti 2004:39). 
The Vietnam War renewed researcher interest in the impact of public opinion on 
foreign policy. Scholars examining surveys spanning six decades found that public opinion 
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was less volatile than previously assumed. Other studies found that public attitudes were more 
coherent and that public opinion may have a greater influence on foreign policy than 
previously assumed (Holsti 2004:41-69). Such findings have led Ole Rudolf Holsti to point 
out “[…] we should not assume that its impact is constant across administrations, 
circumstances, and issues” (Holsti 2004:38). By acknowledging this argument, it seems 
worthwhile to ask how public opinion has had an impact on foreign policy toward China since 
the end of the Cold War. 
 
1.3 The Research Question 
As the Sino-American relationship seems to become increasingly important for international 
relations, and as different scholars make different assumptions about the role of public 
opinion in the formulation of US China policy, it seems apparent that we need to test this 
assumption. The research question presented here is therefore concerned with American 
public opinion and American foreign policy. In its most stripped down version, it can be 
formulated as follows: 
Does American public opinion have an impact on American foreign policy toward China? 
In order to seek an answer to the research question, the thesis will also need to analyze other 
factors that may be influential in explaining American policies toward China: First, to what 
degree can Chinese foreign political behavior toward the US explain American China policy? 
Second, to what degree can other internal factors, such as bureaucratic routine, explain US 
policies toward China? 
 
1.4 Demarcations in Time and Space, Clarifications of the Concepts 
While this thesis may have implications for our understanding of American foreign 
policymaking in general, it needs to make clear its scope, both in terms of the period covered, 
as well as what is meant by “American foreign policies toward China.” 
 While it would definitely be interesting to analyze the whole post-Cold War period, 
this was not possible due to limitations of the dataset used: the “10 Million International 
Dyadic Events” (King and Lowe 2003a) covers the period from January 1st 1990 to December 
31
st
 2004. 
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 Another demarcation is necessary in terms of geographical space: While the research 
question above clearly states that the thesis is concerned with the Sino-American relationship, 
and thus, logically, with the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, it 
should be pointed out here that “American foreign policy toward China” should be understood 
in a narrow sense: Those acts committed by the US directly toward China, such as all public 
statements, sanctions, threats, use of force, threats of use of force, deportations, state visits, 
cooperation etcetera. What “American foreign policy toward China” does not encompass, 
however, are those acts that are committed by the US directly toward other states  ¸but which 
have intended impacts on Sino-American issues. For instance, it may be that American efforts 
to improve its relations with East Asian states may be intended to increase the capabilities of 
the US to encircle China. Similarly, it is quite probable that the recent decision by the Obama 
administration to establish a permanent military presence in Australia is guided by an 
intention to balance the growing power of China (Washington Post 2011). However, while 
these are probable assumptions, they remain assumptions, and attempting to interpret all 
political acts by the US and China according to this logic would likely result in the data-
gathering process being far too resource-demanding, as well the data being highly unreliable, 
suffering from low validity, and/or too incomplete to allow for generalization. 
 
1.5 Theories – The Public, the State, and Foreign Policy 
As mentioned above, theorists of the three IR theories of realism, liberalism and 
constructivism make assumptions about the relationship between public opinion and foreign 
policy. Theories of the realist tradition, such as Classical Realism and Neorealism, tend to put 
little emphasis on public opinion. At the most basic level, as J.W. Taliaferro, S.E. Lobell and 
N.M. Ripsman (2009:14) notes, realist theories are group-centric, focusing on groups of 
human beings rather than individuals. Moreover, “[…] politics is [seen as] a perpetual 
struggle among self-interested groups under conditions of general scarcity and uncertainty” 
(Taliaferro et al. 2009:14). Groups are mainly uncertain about the present and future 
intentions of other groups. Finally, the goals of a group, whether they concern self-
preservation or domination, can only be secured by power. 
 However, such theories focus on the impacts of shifts in international power on 
international relations, not foreign policy. As Fareed Zakaria points out, this distinction is not 
irrelevant: 
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“[…] a theory of international politics cannot explain the motives of nations; it must 
instead make assumptions about them. By contrast, a theory of foreign policy explains 
why different states, or the same state at different historical moments, have different 
intentions, goals, and preferences toward the outside world. (Zakaria 1998:14)” 
For our purpose, as we must attempt to establish whether US China policy is influenced by 
public opinion, we will need to utilize a theory of foreign policy. As Zakaria (1998:15-16) 
points out, a theory of foreign policy may locate the independent variables of the theory at all 
levels of analysis: the international, national, bureaucratic or decision-making level. One 
possible theoretical approach to assessing the influence of public opinion on American China 
policy may be Neoclassical realism, as theorists within this tradition emphasize the neorealist 
assumption “[…] that the international system structures and constrains the policy choices of 
states”(Taliaferro et al. 1998:19). According to Zakaria (1998:16), “[a] good theory […] 
would first examine the impact of the international system on foreign policy, for the most 
important general characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative standing in 
the international system.” However, neoclassical realist theories take issue with the tendency 
of neorealists to treat the state as a “black box” and the claim that all states will pursue similar 
strategies in the face of similar challenges. Rather, they are concerned about the relation 
between the state and the domestic society, and seek to utilize domestic factors as intervening 
variables (Taliaferro et al. 1998:19-21). Colin Dueck for example, argues that state officials in 
all democracies need to “[…] contend with an array of interest groups, public opinion, 
normative considerations, electoral pressures, and legislative prerogatives when making 
foreign policy decisions” (1998:147). Thus, neoclassical realism seems able to include both 
international and domestic factors. 
As indicated by the research question, the focus of the thesis is not to test any specific 
theory: rather, it is to test the assumptions of theories. This is also reflected in the stated 
hypotheses in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. Accordingly, neoclassical realism should be 
understood as a framework within which assumptions necessary for the identification of the 
structural vector autoregression model can be made. Thus, while the results indicate that 
public opinion does have a significant impact on American China-policies, this finding does 
not merely support neoclassical realism, but also other models assuming such a causal relation. 
Finally, it should be noted that while theories such as liberalism and constructivism were 
mentioned above, they will not be applied in this thesis. 
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1.6 Structure 
This thesis is organized as follows: Following this first, introductory chapter, Chapter Two 
starts by briefly describing the development of the debate on American foreign policy and the 
public opinion, before it establishes the framework on how we might expect the public to 
influence the foreign policy of the US by drawing on theories of Comparative Politics and 
neoclassical realism. The chapter then goes on to discuss how policymakers and the media 
may influence the public, in essence arguing that it is likely that the relationship between 
American foreign policy and American public opinion is endogenic: the one influences the 
other, and vice versa. The final part of the chapter presents the stated hypotheses, and 
comments are made on the understanding of foreign policy used in the thesis. 
 The first part of the third chapter is concerned with discussing the methodological 
challenges faced by a thesis discussing the influence of public opinion. I then go on to discuss 
the benefits and disadvantages of using event data to construct variables for the foreign 
policies of states, I briefly describe the dataset “10 Million International Dyadic Events” 
(King and Lowe 2003a), which is the dataset used for this thesis. After explaining in detail 
how the variables for the foreign policies of the US and China were constructed, I explain 
how the variable measuring American public opinion was constructed: Building on the theory 
of Chapter Two, I argue that the perceived public opinion is what matters when policymakers 
formulate their foreign policies, and as it has been found elsewhere that policymakers list the 
mass media as their main source of information regarding public opinion, a quantitative 
content analysis is performed to obtain an approximation of public opinion. In the final part of 
the chapter, I identify the vector autoregression (VAR) model and the structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) model, after having identified dummy variables for presidential 
administrations and three events having great impact on the Sino-American relationship that 
should not be seen as part of the endogenous equation of such models. 
 In the fourth chapter, I present the results of the models, before I analyze the results 
and their implications for the hypotheses. The data are analyzed by using Granger causation 
Wald tests, by studying the signs of the coefficients, by estimating the error terms of the 
different equations for the VAR model, and by analyzing the results of impulse-response 
functions and forecast error variance decomposition for the SVAR model. In short, it is found 
that American foreign policy toward China seems to be influenced by bureaucratic routine, 
Chinese policies toward the US and, importantly, by American public opinion. 
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 In the fifth chapter, the assumptions of the models in Chapter Four are tested, as well 
as properties of the data which may, potentially, cause researchers to make the wrong 
inferences. The final, and sixth, chapter is dedicated to concluding remarks. 
2.0 Theory – An Overview 
In order to ascertain the degree to which American public opinion has an impact on US China 
policy, a theoretical framework is needed. Such a framework will need to be able to explain 
not only what factors we should expect to have an impact on American China policy, but also 
how these factors may have an impact. More to the point, the theoretical framework must 
provide us with hints as to how we should study the hypothetical link between foreign policy 
and public opinion. After briefly surveying the literature on theories of foreign policy, where I 
present the debate of whether public opinion does have an impact on foreign policy, I will 
outline the approach labeled “neoclassical realism” by Gideon Rose (1998). Utilizing this 
approach holds several advantages, as it asserts that international factors do not influence 
foreign policy directly, but are moderated by domestic factors. Furthermore, most neoclassical 
realists claim that not only material factors matter, but also the perceptions of policymakers. 
Having presented the basic assumptions and views of neoclassical realism, I then go 
on to present the more specific arguments of neoclassical realists as well as students of 
Comparative Politics of why we should assume that American public opinion impacts on US 
foreign policy in general. While it has become common among neoclassical realist (and others) 
to assume the perceptions of state leaders of international relations and relative power matter 
more than material factors in the short run, I argue that this assumption should hold for the 
domestic factors as well: How the US state leader and his administration perceive public 
opinion may matter more than how public opinion “really” is. Having done this, I will discuss 
what factors influence public opinion. This matters, because if it is reasonable to assume, as 
some have done, that public opinion is totally malleable, either by US state leaders, the media 
or other domestic actors, then there is no reason to study the relationship between public 
opinion and foreign policy. 
In the final part of this chapter, I will present the main hypotheses of the thesis by 
briefly accounting for the Sino-American relationship and some of the main issues where it 
can be assumed that American public opinion can, to a lesser or greater degree, impact on US 
foreign policy toward China. 
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2.1 The Debates: The Normative and the Descriptive 
The debate on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy issues is not merely a question 
of whether such a relationship exists, empirically, but also a question of whether such a 
relationship should exist – that is, a normative question. Historically, the debate between 
thinkers seen as realists and liberals over the issue of whether the public should be able to 
influence the foreign policy of states has been the most prominent. While the latter have 
argued that public opinion is a force for good, and thus a necessary factor in order to secure a 
sound foreign policy, the former have usually argued that the public is too emotional, too 
uninformed and too short-sighted to be allowed to be involved in foreign policymaking 
(Holsti 2004:3). 
 As realists and liberalists disagree vehemently over the consequences of allowing the 
public to influence foreign policy, it is no surprise that scholars have directed their attention 
toward studying whether the public is able to influence foreign policy. Sharing the view of 
most realists, Gabriel Almond, writing in the post-WWII period, saw the public as generally 
uninterested in public policy – and even less interested in foreign policy and international 
relations. This indifference about international relations became evident when respondents 
were asked to name the most important challenge for the USA: the American public was 
unlikely to name a foreign policy issue as the most important challenge, except in times of 
crisis. Furthermore, “[f]or persons responsible for the making of security policy these mood 
impacts of the mass public have a highly irrational impact. Often public opinion is apathetic 
when it should be concerned, and panicky when it should be calm” (Almond in Holsti 
2004:31). To the relief of Almond and those equally skeptical about public opinion (including 
diplomat George Kennan and columnist Walter Lippmann), it was also generally accepted 
that the public had no influence over foreign policy. Rather, it was expected that the public 
would “rally around the flag” whenever state leaders needed public support (Ringsmose and 
Børgesen 2011:510). Moreover, interviews conducted with State Department officials 
revealed the attitude that the public needed to be educated on issues of foreign policy, and, 
because of this, should not be seen as an entity that should have an impact. Furthermore, 
election studies found little evidence that foreign policy issues influence voting patterns, and 
case studies conducted in the same period made few references to public opinion (Holsti 
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2004:38-39).
2
 As a consequence, foreign policy analysts were generally of the opinion that the 
public had little or no influence over foreign policy, and the principle of the “Primat der 
Aussenpolitik” remained unchallenged (Ringsmose og Børgesen 2011:510). 
 With the public protests against the Vietnam War, however, the interest of analysts in 
the nature of public opinion, in understanding the impact of public opinion and how public 
opinion is formed was renewed. Research based on other surveys than the ones used by 
Almond found that American public opinion was far more stable and consistent in its attitudes 
than previously assumed (Holsti 2004:42-49). Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
presidents were concerned about how the public would react to specific decisions. Interviews 
with General Norman Scharzkopf indicate that the White House was highly susceptible to 
pressure from public opinion in the run-up to the first Gulf War.
3
 President George H. W. 
Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, indicated that the White House would go to 
war against the regime of Saddam Hussein against Iraq regardless of whether the public 
supported it or not, but that the attitudes of public opinion would affect how the war was 
conducted (Holsti 2004:58-59). In short, public opinion and domestic political groups came to 
be seen as restricting the policy alternatives of state leaders. As the primary goal of 
democratically elected leaders was to stay in office, the argument went, they would support 
the policies that would keep them in office. In the words of Ringsmose and Børgesen, “In 
keeping with this line of reasoning […] elected leaders are little more than windsocks, 
blowing whichever way the public mood takes them. The causal link between public attitudes 
and public policy, so vehemently denied by early realist-oriented scholarship, thus virtually 
came to be taken for granted” (Ringsmose and Børgesen 2011:510). 
 Having described the development of the debate chronologically, it should be 
emphasized that the debate is far from over. As Holsti (2004:67-69) points out, several of the 
analyses show ambiguous results with contradictory findings. The discussion of whether 
public opinion can impact on the foreign policies of states can be seen as part of a greater 
debate about what factors influence the foreign policies of a state. According to Gideon Rose 
                                                          
2
 Of course, the general concern of the foreign policy elite thinkers that the public would be disastrous for 
foreign policy might have had an impact on American presidents as well: American presidents who believed that 
the public is volatile and driven by momentary passions might be less susceptible to the pressure of public 
opinion, than American presidents who believed, like James Mill, that public opinion was a lodestar. 
3
 At the same time, Holsti (2004:58-59) notes that President George H. W. Bush and National Security Advisor 
Brent Snowcroft did not refer to public opinion in their joint memoir. 
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(1998:146-148), there are largely four schools of theories of foreign policy
4
. These are 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
  
                                                          
4
 Theories of foreign policy hold the foreign policies of states as their dependent variable, rather than 
international outcomes. By doing this, they, they are able to explain “the daily stuff” of international politics – 
that is, the everyday behavior of states (Rose 1998:145). 
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Table 1: Summary of Models 
Theory View of the 
International 
System 
View of the Units Underlying Causal Logic 
Innenpolitik 
theories 
Views the 
International 
System as 
unimportant in 
order to explain 
the foreign 
policies of states. 
The Units of the 
system are viewed 
as highly 
differentiated; 
different states are 
expected to behave 
differently. 
 
Internal factors  Foreign policy 
Defensive 
realism 
Occasionally 
views the 
international 
system as 
important. 
The Units of the 
system are viewed 
as highly 
differentiated; 
different states are 
expected to behave 
differently. 
Systemic 
incentives  
(Driving “natural” 
behavior) 
 
Internal factors  
Foreign policy 
(Driving 
“unnatural” 
behavior) 
 
Foreign policy 
 
 
 
 
Foreign policy 
 
Neoclassical 
realism 
Views 
international 
system as 
important. 
Anarchy is 
murky, as its 
implications are 
unclear. 
The Units of the 
system are viewed 
as differentiated; 
similar states are 
expected to behave 
similarly. 
Systemic 
incentives  
 
(Independent 
variable) 
Internal 
factors  
 
(Intervening 
variable) 
Foreign 
policy 
Offensive 
realism 
Views the 
international 
system as very 
important. 
Anarchy is seen 
to be Hobbesian. 
The Units of the 
system are viewed 
as undifferentiated; 
states are expected 
to behave 
similarly. 
Systemic incentives  Foreign policy 
(Rose 1998:154) 
2.2 Neoclassical realism 
Like all scholars adhering to the realist approach, neoclassical realists share a 
“…pessimistic view of the human condition and the prospects for change in human behavior; a rejection 
of teleological conceptions of politics or notions of an ‘end of history’; […] ‘a skeptical attitude toward 
schemes for pacific international order’; […] and the recognition that ethics and morality are products 
of power and material interests, not the other way around” (Taliaferro et al. 2009:14). 
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Furthermore, J.W. Taliaferro, S. E. Lobell and N. M. Ripsman (2009:14-15) goes on to list 
three core principles and assumptions that neoclassical realists have in common with realists 
in general. First, neoclassical realism, like all forms of realism, is group-centric. As humans 
cannot survive as individuals, they live in larger groups. These groups provide security for 
their members from external enemies, and are in turn able to command their members’ loyalty. 
Being group-centric, most neoclassical realists view the state as the most important actor in 
international politics.
5
 Furthermore, as resources, both material and social, are scarce, and as 
groups cannot know the present or future intentions of other states, politics is “…a perpetual 
struggle among self-interested groups” (Taliaferro et al. 2009:14). Finally, regardless of 
whether a group’s goal is survival or domination over other groups, a group needs power in 
order to secure its goals. 
 According to neorealists, systemic forces are ultimately the driving forces of the 
foreign policies of states. To the point, they argue that the single most important factor in 
explaining the external behavior of states is their relative material power position in the 
international system, thus reiterating the classic quote of Thucydides that “the strong do what 
they can and the weak do what they must” (Thucydides in Rose 1998:146). Theories focusing 
primarily on domestic factors are wrong they claim, because the foreign policy choices of 
states are, over time, limited by their position in the international system. States, neoclassical 
realists assume, primarily seek power – generally understood as power resources and 
capabilities – to be able to influence the world around them: states and state leaders prefer 
being more influential in international politics rather than being less influential. Furthermore, 
they argue, states experiencing a growth in power resources relative to other states, are likely 
to become more ambitious externally (Rose 1998:151-152). 
However, while the distribution of material power capabilities is the primary driver of 
state behavior, there is no “…immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material 
capabilities to foreign policy behavior” (Rose 1998:147). This is due to two reasons; first, the 
actual foreign policy choices are taken by political leaders and elites – that is, human beings. 
While these human beings attempt to understand the relative power relationships between 
states as well as the intentions of other state leaders, these understandings are bound to be 
imperfect. This is partly due to the same difficulties faced by scholars of international politics. 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted, however, that some neoclassical realists have argued that neoclassical realism should be less 
concerned with whether a group is a state or not, and more concerned with whether a group is able to act as a 
unit in the international system (See Vennesson 2011). 
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There is no uncontested way of measuring power. As an example, Taliaferro et al. (2009:29) 
notes that state bureaucracies and political leaders of Britain and the Soviet Union debated 
how to measure power when these states experienced relative power decline at the end of the 
19
th
 Century and in the late 1970s respectively. This, of course, made adjusting strategy to 
new relative power positions more problematic. Furthermore, as William C. Wohlforth notes: 
Power cannot be tested; different elements of power possess different utilities at different times; the 
relation of perceived power to material resources can be capricious; the mechanics of power are 
surrounded by uncertainty; states possess different conversion rations and comparative advantages; the 
perceived prestige hierarchy and the military distribution may not coincide for prolonged periods; states 
adopt asymmetrical strategies to maximize their positions and undercut rivals; signals get confused 
among allies, rivals and domestic audiences (Wohlforth in Taliaferro et al. 2009:29). 
In other words, what matters is not necessarily the actual distribution of power capabilities at 
a given time: rather it is the perceptions of state leaders that matter. While such perceptions 
are not formed independently of a state’s relative power position – they are, for example, 
influenced by exogenous shocks such as unexpected military or foreign political defeats and 
victories – they are what actually matters when foreign policy is formed. This means that the 
foreign policy of a state may not correspond to its material power capabilities over shorter 
periods, even if it does so over longer periods of time (Rose 1998:147; Taliaferro et al. 
2009:29-30). In this way, Gideon Rose argues, neoclassical realists seem to occupy a 
“…middle ground between structural theorists and constructivists” (1998:151-152). 
 Second, the political leaders of a state are often not able to utilize the power resources 
of the state however they like, as political arrangements “…frequently compel [them] to 
bargain with domestic actors (such as the legislature, political parties, economic sectors, 
classes, or the public as a whole) in order to enact policy and extract resources to implement 
policy choices” (Taliaferro et al. 2009:25). Furthermore, the autonomy of state leaders may 
even change over time as they might sometimes have to bargain away some of their autonomy 
to get the policy outcomes they want, like Egyptian and Israeli state leaders had to in order to 
conduct wars in 1967 and 1973 (Taliaferro et al. 2009:27) As they acknowledge that the 
autonomy of state leaders from domestic society varies across states, as well as across time, 
neoclassical realists need not assume that different states (or, indeed, the same state at 
different times) will react to external pressures in the same way, even if their relative power 
position in the international system is comparable (Rose 1998:147). Finally, by allowing for 
the influence of domestic actors, neoclassical realists do not assume that states need act as 
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“unitary” actors. Rather, the ability of states to respond to the pressures of the international 
system is influenced by consensus or disagreements among elites, “…persistent internal 
divisions within the leadership, social cohesion, and the regime’s vulnerability to violent 
overthrow” (Taliaferro et al. 2009:28). 
2.3 The Impact of Domestic Society on American Foreign Policy 
As argued above, neoclassical realists acknowledge that the foreign policy of states may be 
influenced by domestic factors such as public opinion. However, a lot remains to be clarified: 
Why and how would we expect public opinion to have an impact on foreign policy? While 
neoclassical realists have attempted to explain the relationship between domestic actors and 
foreign policy in detail, this chapter will also utilize theories from comparative politics, as 
theorists of comparative politics have attempted to describe the relationship in greater detail. 
2.3.1 Presidential Preeminence 
As a first step toward the study of US foreign policy, this thesis will begin by defining the 
central actor in US foreign policymaking. It is quite uncontroversial to argue that the president 
of the United States is preeminent in US foreign policymaking. The sources of this 
presidential preeminence stems partly from the US Constitution and partly from the 
“…combination of judicial interpretation, legislative acquiescence, personal assertiveness, 
and custom and tradition” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996:340). According to the Constitution, 
the president of the United States should be commander in chief of the armed forces, have the 
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties as well as to appoint 
ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls. The President is also authorized to 
receive foreign ambassadors (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996:340). As Kegley and Wittkopf 
(1996:340-341) note, little else in the Constitution deals directly with presidential powers in 
foreign affairs. In 1936, the Supreme Court, in the case United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corporation, ruled that the president acts “…as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations” (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996:341). 
Furthermore, presidential practice over time has led to presidential supremacy when foreign 
policy is formulated and executed. While the US Congress has attempted to limit the powers 
of the US presidency, especially following the Vietnam War and the Watergate Affair, the 
president remains preeminent in US foreign policymaking (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996:342-
343). 
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2.3.2 Domestic Society in the US: How and When Does It Impact? 
While the above paragraph demonstrates how it may be argued that the American presidency 
is formally preeminent in the making of foreign policy, this is not to argue that American 
foreign policymaking is exempt from pressures from domestic society. As Norrin M. Ripsman 
(2009:171-174, 178-179) points out, in writing about the influence of domestic actors upon 
national security policy, it seems quite uncontroversial to claim that, whatever other domestic 
interests an American president may have, he/she is concerned about his/her own reelection. 
If the White House fails to consider the public when formulating its policies, this may come to 
threaten the reelection of a president. Of course, it may be argued that the public should, 
theoretically, have less influence over foreign policy – especially security policy – than it has 
over domestic policy. First, because the consequences of a mishandled foreign policy may be 
disastrous for the public as a whole, domestic actors may be less willing to use foreign affairs 
as an arena for domestic power struggle (private gain). Also, because the foreign policy 
executive (that is, the President, the Cabinet and the Departments) has access to information 
kept secret from the public as a whole, domestic actors may acknowledge that the foreign 
policy executive may be in a better position to decide what policy actions are in the state’s 
long-term interest. Second, the costs and benefits of foreign policy usually are widely 
distributed among all domestic actors, even if they are unequally distributed. Because 
politically strong interest groups seldom form when costs and benefits of policy are diffuse, 
we should not expect such interest groups to form in order to attempt to influence foreign 
policy.
6
 Ripsman (2009:181-182) points out, however, that when the opposition is sufficiently 
strong, the foreign policy executive may have to change national security policies. As security 
policy is less susceptible to influence by public opinion than “regular” foreign policy, we may 
assume that public opinion can constrain American presidents in foreign policy more when 
the issues concerned are unrelated to security policy. 
7
 
                                                          
6
 Of course, there are foreign policy issues in which costs and benefits are not widely distributed. When interest 
groups form that also have great leverage over voter groups, they may be able to influence foreign policy. For 
example, ethnic diasporas such as the Cuban diaspora in Florida can be influential when foreign policy is 
formulated, and in the case of the Cuban diaspora, this influence is greatly increased due to Florida often being 
an influential swing state in US federal elections. 
7
 Furthermore, Ripsman (2009:184-185) also argues that domestic actors may influence American presidents in 
national security by threatening to veto the president’s policies toward security issues in order to get payoffs in 
another policy area. Finally, domestic actors such as the media and think tanks may act as epistemic 
communities, influencing the perceptions of an American president and defining national interests. As they do 
not concern the influence of public opinion on foreign policy directly, these latter two points are less important 
for this paper. 
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Ripsman goes on to discuss when the impact of domestic actors upon national security 
policy may be the greatest. Generally, domestic actors are expected to have the greatest 
influence “…during stable periods when the state faces a low-threat international environment” 
(Ripsman 2009:186). When states face existential threats, when war is seen as imminent, and 
when the margin for error is minimal, governments have every incentive to ignore demands of 
domestic actors and formulate policy in a way that maximizes the security of the state. In the 
opposite situation, when states face no existential threats and war is seen as a distant 
possibility, foreign policy executives may find that the benefits of allowing domestic actors to 
influence foreign policy to outweigh the costs. In such periods, American administrations may 
benefit from allowing foreign policy to be heavily influenced by public opinion. 
 On a final note, Ripsman (2009:191) argues that domestic actors may have more 
impact on some aspects of foreign policymaking than others aspects. While public opinion is 
unlikely to have much influence over the definition of national interest, and only when war is 
seen as a remote threat, domestic actors are likely to have some influence over the means used 
to implement foreign policy, and even more influence over the “timing and style”(Ripsman 
2009:191). This is in line with the assertion of former Secretary of Defense Richard “Dick” 
Cheney that “…presidents do not undertake major military interventions primarily out of 
domestic political concerns. Yet the specific forms of intervention, including their timing, 
implementation, and public representation, are frequently powerfully influenced by domestic 
political constraints and incentives” (Dueck 2009:148). This influence of the public may 
explain why the strategies used during the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Iraq War can be 
seen as suboptimal. The presidents responsible wished to remain popular and adopted policies 
popular among the public (Dueck 2009:166-167). 
 
2. 4 Knowing Public Opinion: Perception Matters 
Having argued that public opinion is likely to have an impact on foreign policy, one important 
question remains. As American presidents and their administrations are worried about support 
from public opinion, how do they go about gauging this support? No less important: how do 
they assess what the American public wants them to do? 
An often-used introduction to the study of the impacts of public opinion on public 
policy, is to note Valdimer Orlando Key’s definition of public opinion as “…opinions held by 
private persons which governments find it prudent to heed”(Key 1961:14). This definition is 
useful as it allows for the possibility that governments – and presidents – do not hold similar 
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views of public opinion and the extent to which they should allow public opinion to influence 
their policies. Having asserted above that the perception of state leaders of the state’s relative 
power position may be more important than the “actual” relative power position, it may also 
be argued that the state leader’s perception of public opinion may be more important than 
what the public (as a whole) actually thinks and believes: As Ole R. Holsti (2004:15-26, 301-
308) points out, all American presidents since Roosevelt have used polling as a guide to find 
out what public opinion meant at any given moment. However, this does not mean that they 
have all seen polling as a valuable tool for assessing American public opinion. President 
Roosevelt was especially interested in polls, and a secret organization, Research Council 
Incorporated, was establish to provide the American president with charts of trends in public 
opinion. Harry Truman, on the other hand, was more skeptical toward polling data, and 
preferred mail and telegrams from voters after his speeches to assess public opinion. 
Truman’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, for his part, preferred to use opinions printed 
in the media as an indicator of public opinion. While preferences over which indicators are 
best suited to assess public opinion varies, Robert M. Entman (2004:123) points out that 
recent surveys among members of Congress, presidential appointees and members of the 
Senior Executive Service show that those working in the executive branch of government 
claim that they use media as a primary source to get information about public opinion. Few 
government leaders stated that they relied on polls of public opinion, with the exception of the 
polls monitoring the president’s approval rating. 
The point being made is that presidents and their staffs do not have any way of 
knowing what the state of public opinion is when they form their policies, even with modern 
polling techniques, and that they tend to rely on media rather than polling data. What matters, 
thus, is not public opinion, but the perceived public opinion or perceived majority, that is: the 
“…perceptions held by most journalists, political elites, and members of the public 
themselves of just where the majority of the public stands” (Entman 2004:127). Such a 
perceived public opinion need not match “actual public opinion.” For example, foreign policy 
leaders in the US tend to believe that the public would prefer to eliminate foreign aid, while 
surveys repeatedly show that the opposite is true. This leads Entman (2004:127) to argue that, 
because surveys may send conflicting signals, foreign policymakers develop their perceptions 
of public opinion 
“…less from surveys than from dominant frames of the issues and events in the news, which are 
assumed to move public opinion in certain directions, from the way media reports invoke “public 
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opinion” and frame Americans’ views, and from the strategic talk and actions of other foreign policy 
leaders who try to convince everyone that the ‘American people’ favor their position” (Entman 
2004:127). 
Related to the conception of perceived public opinion and perceived majorities is the concept 
of anticipated majorities. These are the predictions of foreign policy leaders of how they 
expect the public to respond to certain future outcomes (Entman 2004:127-128). 
 In addition, as foreign policymakers rely on the media to get information of public 
opinion, they may also be interested in knowing how important the public perceives an issue 
to be. If perceiving that there is a public majority opposing the policy of the president on a 
specific issue, but also perceiving that the public does not care enough about the issue to let it 
influence their view of the president, foreign policymakers may discount the public as 
unimportant when formulating policies. For example, it has been argued that the reelection of 
President Reagan in 1984 stemmed more from his administration’s ability to “…manage 
priorities and perceived majorities than from inducing a majority of American to agree with 
his policies”(Entman 2004:128). If we are to believe the polls of the first term of the Reagan 
presidency, majorities disagreed with the president on many of the foreign and domestic 
policies he pursued. As he was reelected, however, the public cannot have weighed the issues 
important enough to vote him out of office (Entman 2004:128-129). 
 
2.5 Who and What Influences Public Opinion? 
“There go my people. I must find out where they’re going so I can lead them.”8 
If we accept the assumptions implied by neoclassical realists that perceptions are what matter 
not only in terms of assessing the relative power capabilities of states, but also in terms of 
assessing the support in public opinion, we are tempted to ask, what then, influences public 
opinion, and what influences how this public opinion is perceived. Indeed, if perceptions of 
public opinion are based on the framing of issues in the media, and the presentation of public 
opinion in the media may differ from “actual public opinion,” should we not rather be 
concerned about impacts of the American media on US foreign policy toward China? The 
                                                          
8
 This quote, though probably apocryphal, is often attributed to Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin, a French 
revolutionary of 1849. The French version is “Il faut bien que je les suive, puisque je suis leur chef.” 
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assertion that both public opinion as well as the perceptions of public opinion by the political 
elite are subject to manipulation by the media is indeed one of the main claims of Robert 
Entman (2004). Following the same line of thought, if we believe that state leaders may 
manipulate public opinion however they like, then there would be no need to study the link 
between public opinion and foreign policy. Policymakers would simply follow whatever 
policies they preferred and manipulate public opinion accordingly. If public opinion can be 
manipulated by the media, state leaders, domestic politicians or other domestic actors, then 
there would be no need to focus on the impacts of public opinion on foreign policy.
9
 
According to Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgesen (2010:512) public opinion 
cannot simply be seen as something “out there.” While it may be true that public opinion is 
able to influence the policy of political leaders, political leaders are also capable of 
influencing and manipulating public opinion. By utilizing “strong and compelling” strategic 
narratives rather than weak narratives, political leaders may be able to decrease the public’s 
sensitivity toward war casualties. A strong narrative will have the characteristics of clarity of 
purpose, prospect of success, consistency, and an absence of competing narratives. By 
studying the cases of public support in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Ringsmose and Børgesen (2011:515-523) 
argue that Danish and UK governments were able to create narratives that made their 
respective publics resistant to war casualties, while the Canadian and Dutch governments 
were unable to create such narratives. In short, the former governments did this by defining 
the mission objective in Afghanistan as one of securing their states and citizens against 
terrorist attacks, and emphasizing that this goal was achievable. The latter governments, on 
the other hand, defined their mission objective in terms of humanitarian and ideological goals, 
and were unable to create confidence that success was probable. The result is an interesting 
account that challenges the assertion of Innenpolitik literature that state leaders are “…merely 
windsocks reacting to the wishes and whims of the electorate” (Ringsmose and Børgesen 
2011:523). 
Attempting to combine his own model of the relationship between the government, 
elites, the media and public opinion with earlier models, Robert M. Entman (2004:144-146) 
constructs a quite complicated model that describes the interplay between the political elites, 
the media and public opinion and how one may affect the other. In short, the model argues 
                                                          
9
 For a detailed argumentation on how the public is manipulable by state leaders, see Mearsheimer (2011). 
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that the media actors can influence how political elites perceive public opinion and other 
elites, as well as how public opinion views the political elites and their political activities. At 
the same time, political activities have real impacts on public opinion as well, just as activities 
of public opinion, such as elections, have “real” impacts for the political elites.  
Table 2: Entmans Model 
 
 Randall L. Schweller, being concerned with the barriers both politicians and media 
actors must overcome in order to manipulate the public, argues that because 
“the new ‘million-channel media universe’, consisting of talk radio, cable television and the Internet 
(YouTube and the blogosphere), offers so many contradictory ‘facts’, ‘truths’ and ‘informed opinions’ 
that people everywhere can essentially select and interpret facts in a way that accords with their own 
personal, idiosyncratic and often flat wrong versions of reality. With so many competing news outlets 
and opinions, we can now seek out and find the kind of political views that please us, no matter how 
absurd; news that tells us what we want to hear, that indulges our political preconceptions and belief 
systems, and that is told by people who think exactly the same way we do” (Schweller 2010:152). 
According to this view, state leaders, the mass media and political leaders lose some of their 
ability to manipulate the public because the public can simply choose other sources of 
information if they do not like the information they are offered. Along the same line of 
thought, it might also be assumed that the major newspapers cannot present news however 
they like. They might have to take the political views of their readers into consideration; 
otherwise, they will risk fewer readers. Of course, it would be wrong to argue that political 
 Elites’ political activity, plus 
 the balance of power between the political parties, plus 
 elites communicating strategically through, among other things, framing contests in the media, 
influence 
 officials’ policy preferences, and their interpretations of public opinion and other political 
calculations. These yield 
 policy decisions and effects and conditions such as unemployment and inflation, (and in the case 
of foreign affairs, war, and peace). Then, 
 news selectively frames these decisions, effects, and conditions, and the framing of 
 these outcomes shape public opinion 
 which elites interpret based in substantial measure in news frames, 
 to which elites respond by further policy activity, 
 while public opinion (as influenced by news frames during and between election campaigns) 
also shapes citizens’ voting, which determines the partisan balance of power. (Entman 2004:145) 
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leaders and journalists can no longer manipulate public opinion at all. However, Schweller’s 
argument serves its purpose by pointing out that public opinion is no more a “windsock” to 
the wishes of state leaders or the media than the other way around. 
Returning to a problem posed by Entman (2004:146), that it is impossible disentangle 
the degree to which political leaders manipulate public opinion as opposed to merely 
anticipating and playing along with public opinion, for the purpose of this thesis, the problem 
is simplified by the fact that I am not concerned about whether state leaders, political elites, or 
the media are able to influence public opinion or not in the long run. There is no denying that 
they can, and there is no denying that they do. It is sufficient to note that state leaders cannot 
manipulate public opinion however and whenever they like and that this public opinion may 
be able to force a state leader to follow policies other than he/she would prefer. 
 
2.6 Hypothesis: How to Describe US China Policy 
As Barbara Kunz and Ilai Z. Saltzman (Forthcoming:110) note, while neoclassical realists are 
concerned with explaining state behavior, they have not yet been able to produce a clear 
definition of state behavior. This may be because foreign policy is somewhat problematic to 
define in itself. The following definition is suggested by Mark Webber and Michael Smith: 
Foreign policy is composed of the goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions taken by states, 
and national governments acting on their behalf, in the context of the external relations of national 
societies. It constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national 
societies (Webber and Smith 2002:9-10). 
The authors (Webber and Smith 2002:10-11) acknowledge that all of the elements of their 
definition are contestable. For example, they note that it is contestable whether the goals and 
values of a foreign policy are endorsed by all of the institutions of a state. Furthermore, they 
question whether it is true that the foreign policy of a state is always clear and unambiguous. 
Moreover, they note that national governments are not necessarily the only international 
actors with a foreign policy. Even so, they argue that a definition has to be chosen for the sake 
of analytical convenience. 
 However, simply choosing a definition of foreign policy does not bring the analyst 
much closer to understanding the foreign policy of a state. This becomes clear when 
surveying the literature on Sino-American relations: In attempting to conceptualize what kind 
of strategy the US is pursuing toward China, scholars disagree on whether the US is 
attempting to encircle, accommodate, balance or hedge against China (Liu and Feng in Ross 
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2009:75; Friedberg 2011:252; Kang 2007:189-192; Tunsjø 2008:109-11). Part of this 
disagreement stems from the differences in opinion over what indicators should be 
emphasized when assessing the foreign policy of a state. However, even if it is problematic 
for scholars to agree on indicators from which the intentions of the actors can be inferred, it is 
not necessary, for the purpose of this thesis, to know in advance why, for example, the 
American administration responded as it did to the collision between two military aircraft 
over the South China Sea in 2001. As this thesis is designed, this is precisely the kind of 
questions that the thesis seeks to answer. 
 Based on the discussion above, Table 3 presents the main hypotheses of the thesis. As 
the phrasing of the hypotheses may seem somewhat vague, it is pointed out that the 
hypotheses will be refined and rephrased at the end of the next chapter, after the methodology 
has been laid out. While most of the hypotheses below follow clearly from what has been 
written above, hypotheses H2c and H5 merit more attention, as the theoretical framework for 
these has not been explained explicitly. H2c is based on theories of rational expectations and 
perceptions. As it was argued above that neoclassical realists might primarily be concerned 
with the perceptions of state leaders, the thesis should attempt to investigate this claim. 
According to Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman (1991:18), state leaders may not 
respond to policy changes of other states, simply because they may have expected this change. 
[It may be argued] that super-power behavior is a function of expected cost (Ct), expected threat (Tt), 
and the information that countries have about the international system (Zt). Formally, superpower 
foreign policy behavior (FPt) can be written as FPt = f(C, Tt; Zt) where Ct = g(Zt) and Tt = h(Zt). 
Assuming that f is a simple linear additive function and that expected costs and threats are calculated 
according to the identities Ct = Ct-1 + ut and Tt = Tt-1+ vt, where ut and vt are unexpected shocks or 
innovations in costs and threats, it follows that superpower behavior will appear to be a random walk: 
FPt = FPt-1 + et, where et = (ut + vt). Then, since superpowers obtain and efficiently process essentially 
the same information, they can form unbiased forecasts of each other's behavior. In turn, only the error 
terms (surprises) will be correlated. (Goldstein and Freeman 1991:18-19) 
In other words, it is only when the perceptions of state leaders are “shocked”, because of the 
unexpected policy changes of others, that the state leader would change his/her own policies. 
 H5 is based on the possibility not laid out explicitly in this chapter, that while public 
opinion may not necessarily have an impact on foreign policy, this does not mean that other 
internal factors, such as bureaucratic routine and other internal actors, do not have an impact 
on foreign policy. Rather, it is possible to view the foreign policy of a state as entirely self-
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driven, and that any changes in foreign policies can be explained by previous changes 
(Goldsteing and Freeman 1991:18, 20). 
 
Table 3: Stated Hypotheses 
 
  Number Stated Hypotheses 
H1 Changes in American public opinion causes changes in 
American foreign policies toward China. 
H2 Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward the US cause 
changes in American foreign policies toward China. 
H2c Changes in American foreign policies toward China are caused 
by changes in Chinese foreign policies toward China deviating 
from expectations.  
H3 Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward the United States 
cause changes in American public opinion. 
H4 Changes in American foreign policies toward China cause 
changes in American public opinion. 
H5 Changes in American foreign policies toward China are caused 
be previous changes in American foreign policies toward China. 
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3.0 Method: Overview 
The purpose of the following chapter is to determine how to best test the hypotheses presented 
in the previous chapter. The first part of the chapter will present and discuss the 
methodological problems faced by all studies on the impacts of public opinion on public 
policy. As it will be made clear, both qualitative and quantitative approaches face major 
challenges when performing research on public opinion and foreign policy. However, it is 
argued that a quantitative approach should be considered most appropriate for the purposes of 
this thesis. In the second part of the chapter, the use of event data is presented, and the 
argument for using event data to measure the foreign policy of a state is put forward. In the 
third part of the chapter, I will briefly present the dataset that will be used, the “10 Million 
Dyadic International Events” (King and Lowe 2003a) Following this, the fourth part of the 
chapter will present how the concepts in the hypotheses are to be operationalized and scored. 
The fifth part of the chapter describes Vector Autoregression as well as Structural Vector 
Autoregression, the statistical techniques applied in the thesis, a variant of time-series analysis. 
 
3.1 General Challenges for Studies on Public Opinion 
When studying the impacts of public opinion on foreign policy, an initial problem faced by 
scholars is defining “the public.” Although the theories presented in the previous chapter 
imply that “the public” is equivalent to the electorate, with presidents primarily fearing that 
they will not be re-elected, at times only sub-groups of the electorate will care enough about 
an issue to let it influence their voting, yet remain important to secure re-election (e.g. the 
Cuban diaspora in Florida). While this thesis assumes, as does Leonard Kusnitz (1984:12) in 
his book Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: American China Policy 1949-1979, that Sino-
American relations is an issue that is relevant to the entire population of the US, the issue of 
defining exactly who constitutes the public is somewhat alleviated by utilizing the definition 
of Keys mentioned in the previous chapter that public opinion is “… those opinions held by 
private persons which the government find it prudent to heed” (1961:14). In other words, 
different governments may find it “prudent to heed” different parts of the public at different 
times. 
A starting point when determining whether American public opinion impacts on 
American foreign policy toward China is to note that it is a question of causation. Applying 
the definition of causation by John Gerring (2005:169), “…causes may be said to refer to 
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events or conditions that raise the probability of some outcome occurring (under ceteris 
paribus conditions),” one may be left with the impression that such a definition is prejudiced 
toward causal arguments assuming probabilistic rather than deterministic causation, as well as 
quantitative methods. Gerring (2005:169-170), however, points out that this is not the case. A 
deterministic cause is a probabilistic cause, and the wording “raise the probability” refers to X 
increasing the probability of Y ontologically, and not the potential for predicting Y given X. 
According to this logic, American public opinion affects (causally) US China policy if (and 
only if) some changed characteristic of American public opinion actually is the cause of a 
change in American foreign policy. While this thesis relies on the concept of Granger 
causation which is a concept for determining whether X predicts Y statistically, it is noted, as 
will be explained below under 3.5, that this concept can only be used to make inferences 
about causation when it is coupled with the theoretical discussion of Chapter Two. 
 
3.1.1 Knowing the Intentions of Policymakers, Case Studies, and Quantitative 
Approaches 
When attempting to determine whether public opinion has had an impact on American foreign 
policy toward China, it would seem intuitive simply to ask the foreign policymakers how 
policy choices were taken, and what factors influenced their decision-making process. If one 
could, by so-called process tracing, show that public opinion influenced policymakers at any 
point in the process, it would seem likely that a causal relationship between public opinion 
and foreign policy had been established (George and Bennett 2005:206-207). However, while 
process-tracing as a method has proven its value for theory testing, it may be unfit for 
assessing the impacts of public opinion. As Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett argue, 
the “…inferential and explanatory value of a causal path is weakened, though not negated, if 
the evidence on whether a certain step in the putative causal path conformed to expectations is 
simply unobtainable” (George and Bennett 2005:222). For research on foreign policy 
decision-making, this is one of the major problems, as data on the decision-making progress 
and the motivations of the actors may be exempt from the public (Kusnitz 1984:14). 
Moreover, even when statements from policymakers exist about what factors 
influenced their policies, students of foreign policymaking should hesitate to accept such 
statements as true. Policymakers may think it preferable to portray their policies as in line 
with public opinion and claim that public opinion is the basis for their decision-making, as 
few American presidents would want to be seen to fly in the face of the American public. 
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Furthermore, state leaders, when communicating with foreign governments, may claim that 
public sentiment requires them to follow a certain policy, even when the domestic situation 
would allow him/her to pursue other policies as well, because this tactic may cause the other 
government to agree to a deal they would not accept under different circumstances. At the 
same time, state leaders and foreign policy officials may also attribute foreign policy 
decisions to “national interest,” even when pressure from the public is a more relevant factor. 
Policymakers may prefer to attribute their actions to them “doing the right thing” rather than 
to being forced by the public. Furthermore, state leaders, may claim that the “national interest” 
requires them to pursue certain policy actions, when these actions should rather be attributed 
to the policymaker preferring one policy for personal reasons (Putnam 1988:440, 457; Holsti 
2004:37, 40). 
It should be noted, however, that such challenges do not stop researchers from arguing 
that the qualitative approach can be useful when studying the impacts of public opinion. 
Holsti (2004:64), for example, advocates the use of case studies based on archival research 
and elite interviews, as he claims that only these techniques can 
[u]ncover how, if at all, decision makers perceive public opinion; feel themselves motivated or 
constrained by it; factor it into their identification and assessment of policy options; and otherwise take 
it into account when selecting a course of action, including a decision not to act. (Holsti 2004:65) 
Of course, it may be argued that such an approach would be vulnerable to the challenges 
presented above. There are reasons to be concerned about the truthfulness and degree of 
honest introspection of the interview subjects, and the lack of references to public opinion in 
archives does not necessarily mean that public opinion is irrelevant, i.e. the problem of post 
hoc justifications. For our purposes, however, it may be more problematic that the approach 
restricts the researcher to study only those aspects and issues of foreign policy where he/she 
has access to archives and/or interview subjects willing and able to answer questions about 
foreign policymaking. Obviously, such requirements would likely prevent research on the 
impacts of public opinion on contemporary US policymaking toward China. 
 Another point regarding case study research on the impact of public opinion is that 
such research has tended to be anecdotal. Kusnitz (1984:5) argues that the debate on the 
impact of public opinion on foreign policy has been dominated by anecdotal evidence 
presented by journalists and past public officials, claiming, in newspaper articles and memoirs, 
that public opinion was decisive in a certain situation. It may, of course, be doubtful whether 
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such – often journalistic – writing has taken alternative explanations into account. A greater 
challenge, however, is that “cherry-picking” those cases where public opinion had an impact 
on foreign policy may lead us to over-estimate the degree to which American foreign policy is 
influenced by public opinion (King et al. 1994:128-129, 139). As this thesis is concerned with 
the possibility of being able to generalize the findings to US China policy in general, such an 
approach may do little to generate new knowledge. 
 It should be noted that the use of the concept “case study” by Holsti and Kusnitz does 
not necessarily overlap the definition put forward by Gerring. Case studies need neither be 
anecdotal nor use a qualitative approach. According to Gerring, a case study “…may be 
understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least 
in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (2007:20). Applying this definition it is 
obvious that studying US China policy over a period, using time series analysis, would be 
considered a case study. While non-case study research by definition needs to be quantitative, 
the opposite is not true (Gerring 20007:22, 33). 
 While there can be no doubt that qualitative approaches hold several merits, providing 
the ability to “…penetrate […] the decision-making black box and the ability to provide a 
different kind of purchase on causality…” (Page 1994:28), it should be equally clear that 
applying a quantitative approach holds several advantages as well. First, quantitative 
approaches are especially useful for measuring minor differences and weak causal impacts. 
While qualitative approaches are useful when studying strong causal impacts, it is by no 
means given that the impact of public opinion is strong. Furthermore, quantitative methods, 
being concerned with measuring concepts as reliably as possible, offer a way to measure the 
pressure from public opinion – as well as other factors – over time. It is this focus on 
measurement that forms the basis for estimating the degree of relationship between the 
phenomena of researcher interest, which in turn offers a way for the quantitative researcher to 
make statements about causality (Bryman 2004:66,76). As King et al. argue that “correlation 
is not causation” (1994:75), it should be noted that causality – and causal impacts – cannot be 
established, no matter whether a quantitative or a qualitative approach is used. The best a 
social scientist can do is to try to infer causality from the data, most often with the aid of a 
theoretical framework (King et al. 1994:76-79). 
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3.1.2 Public Opinion Research and the Problem of Reverse Causality 
A problem faced by those who base their research on quantitative methods is that of 
determining the causal pathway, akin to the problem of determining whether the chicken or 
the egg came first. Imagine that it was found that what state leaders say about an issue 
correlates perfectly with how the issue is presented in the media, and that the way an issue is 
presented in the media predicts perfectly how public opinion perceives a political issue. Such 
a finding would not necessarily mean that state leaders are able to manipulate the media and 
the public, and that any claim that public opinion is able to impact on foreign policy would be 
false. An alternative explanation would be possible: State leaders may anticipate how the 
media and the public would respond to any statements they make, and adapt their statements 
to gain a favorable response (Entman 2004:145-146). Thus, it is hard to determine whether 
public opinion has had an impact on the foreign policymaking of a state, or whether the 
foreign policymakers has had an impact on public opinion, just by stating that one correlates 
with the other. The problem is known as that of reverse causality, that is, that of determining 
which variables should be seen as independent and which should be seen as dependent 
(Bryman 2004:76; Lund 2002:117). The problem is amplified by the fact that, according to 
the model of Entman presented in the previous chapter, the policies of state leaders may 
change public opinion, which in turn may influence future policies. In other words, it is 
probable that both variables may influence each other in turn. 
However, it should be pointed out that while state leaders may be able to influence 
public opinion over time, they run the risk of reducing their own scope of action, in effect 
making policymakers less likely to attempt such manipulation. As Putnam argues, even 
though state leaders may rally support from their constituents to demonstrate their 
commitment to a given position when bargaining with other state leaders, such “…tactics may 
have irreversible impacts on constituents’ attitudes, hampering subsequent ratification of a 
compromise agreement” (Putnam 1988:450). While state leaders may be able to influence 
public opinion over longer periods, they may be unable to do so over shorter periods. This 
implies that state leaders may at times lack support from public opinion to pursue their 
favored policies, which may require them to abstain from pursuing these policies. Kusnitz 
argues that this was the case when American leaders were reluctant to improve relations 
toward the People’s Republic of China: “Behind Eisenhower’s moral concern, and Dulles’s 
more tactical stance, also lay certain domestic political imperatives. Opinion as harshly set as 
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that against China – even if led there by government actions – presented no real incentive to 
cross it without advance preparation” (Kusnitz 1984:69).  
 Having noted that research on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy is 
challenged by serious methodological problems, such challenges should not deter scholars 
from studying this relationship. While we cannot trust the statements of policymakers, it is 
possible – applying time series analysis – to assess whether it is probable that public opinion 
has an impact on foreign policy. This argument will be developed in 3.5 Time Series Analysis: 
Vector Autoregression. 
 
3.2 Measuring Foreign Policy: Event Data 
As established in the previous chapter, it would be far too ambitious to attempt to sum up the 
foreign policy of the US toward China by relying on a few indicators: For instance, it would 
be possible to choose a few indicators believed to capture important characteristics of the 
relationship, such as the defense budget, the size of the trade, etcetera, or to gauge how salient 
the Sino-American relationship, and its specific issues, are to the American president and his 
staff. However, all of these alternatives are problematic as it may be argued that they do not 
really measure American policies toward China. While focusing on “salient issues” would 
allow us to escape some of this criticism, assuming that policymakers are concerned with 
what they claim they are concerned with is problematic as such claims are likely to be 
influenced by public opinion. For instance, policymakers might claim that they are concerned 
with whatever issues the public is concerned with, yet such claims may not be reflected in 
actual policymaking. 
 Another approach is to use so-called event data, defined by Philip A. Schrodt and 
Deborah J. Gerner in the following way: 
Event data – nominal or ordinal codes recording the interactions between international actors as 
reported in the open press – break down complex political activities into a sequence of basic building 
blocks (e.g., comments, visits, grants, rewards, protests, demands, threats, and military engagements). 
(1994:826) 
The use of event data, then, is a formal method to measure the behavior of actors (especially 
states) toward other actors, as this behavior is reported by news agencies. While the use of 
such data were among the most popular among scholars of international relations and foreign 
policy during the 1960s and 1970s, the use of the method decreased during the 1980s as it did 
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not live up to the expectations of students of international relations and policymakers to 
produce good forecasts for foreign policy behaviors and systemic change, and because the 
method had to rely on human coding of newspaper articles. However, due to the rise of 
machine-assisted coding since the early 1990s, event data no longer needs to rely on a tedious, 
resource-demanding coding process involving human coders. This development has led to an 
increase in the use of event data (Veen 2008:3-4). 
 In short, event data is a way of summarizing the policies of one actor toward another 
actor, essentially by describing “who did what to whom, when.” For instance, if state A 
declares war against state B at a certain point in time, or if the leader of state B visits state A, 
then this will be recorded in the data. Depending on the coding scheme used, “declare war” 
and “state visit” can be categorized in different ways, for instance as “conflictual” and 
“cooperative,” “negative” and “positive,” “use of force” and “state visit” as well as in other, 
more detailed ways. Furthermore, it is common practice to score different events by scales, 
such as the Goldstein scale, the COPDAP scale, and the CAMEO scale, allowing researchers 
to model that some events/acts are more conflictual or cooperative than others are.
10
 By using 
event data, we can ascertain changes in American foreign policies as well as changes in the 
policies of other states over time, in years, quarters, months, or weeks, depending on the 
aggregation interval (Veen 2008:11-14). For the purposes of this thesis, event data seem to 
offer the most reliable and most valid way to measure changes in foreign policies over time. 
 Of course, this is not to say that the use of event data is without problems: The most 
common criticism points out, correctly, that “…event data do not represent real events, but 
only observations of events” (Veen 2008:14). This criticism is concerned with measurement 
validity, that is whether “…scores […] meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the 
corresponding concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001:530). First, the critics claim, real events 
have to be observed, interpreted, written down and edited in order to be “seen” by the event 
data coders, potentially introducing bias as not all events are considered newsworthy by 
journalists: Some events may be considered less newsworthy because of geographical 
distance from the event to the newspapers, and some events tend to be considered as more 
newsworthy because of their perceived significance, often meaning that they are violent. If 
this is the case, then the policy of one country toward another may be scored as more 
conflictual than it really is, because conflictual events are more likely to be recorded. Second, 
                                                          
10
 For instance, the threat of use of force should probably be seen as less conflictual than the use of force. 
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the coding of the data may introduce ideological bias, as coding schemes have been developed 
based on the theoretical assumptions of the schools of international relations theory. While 
COPDAB and WEIS are based on realist assumptions, CAMEO and PANDA are based on the 
theories of liberalism (Veen 2008:14-15). 
 While this thesis acknowledges these issues, it may be argued that these issues are 
more prominent for dyads where one or both of the states are seen as “unimportant.” The 
Sino-American dyad is not likely to fit this description for the period covered in this thesis – it 
can be assumed that almost all publicly known “important” events will be reported. Another – 
related – strand of criticism asks whether it is reasonable to assume that the “really significant” 
events in the Sino-American relationship are even reported to the news agencies: “Especially 
when it comes to high-politics, there is reason to believe these significant events are reduced 
to classified meetings, which won’t be reported in the open press” (Veen 2008:15). There is 
some truth in this criticism as part of American China policy is likely to consist of 
contingency plans and long-term strategies agreed upon in classified meetings among high-
ranking officials. Moreover, some of the outcomes of meetings between Chinese and 
American state leaders may well be classified and exempt from the public. As part of the 
reason for keeping plans, strategies and outcomes of meetings secret may be to avoid pressure 
from the public, there is a chance that we, by excluding such events from the data, risk 
overestimating the impact of the public on foreign policy. However, this is a problem for all 
foreign policy analysis: there is always a possibility that the researcher does not have access 
to information that would invalidate his/her results, and it seems unfair to argue that event 
data is more vulnerable to this aspect of measurement validity. 
 Another branch of criticism is concerned with the scaling and aggregation of the 
events data. The rationale behind these procedures is that event data are discrete counts, and 
that it is less complicated not to have to model event data as time-series of counts. However, 
aggregating the data into time intervals such as weeks, months, or years, and assigning 
different event types with certain values is not without problems of its own. First, aggregating 
the data is problematic as the researcher loses information about the order in which events 
took place, but it is necessary, as most of the data points would be recorded without events if 
the events were not aggregated. Second, Veen (2008:16) notes that the creation of event 
scales seems somewhat arbitrary, as there seems to be a lot of disagreement among scholars 
concerning how to scale certain event types. Third, event weights are not linked to other event 
weights by theory, which may, for some scales, lead to peculiar instances were a month with 
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three riots is given the same score as a month with nuclear war. Of course, it is reasonable to 
assume that several minor incidents may equal one major incident, but as the example with 
riots and nuclear war demonstrates, such comparisons do not always make sense (Veen 
2008:15-16). Accordingly, it is argued here that the coefficients should not be interpreted in 
terms of policy acts, and the thesis will refrain from making statements about what measures 
state A would use to respond to a change in behavior by state B. 
 A final point is that it is debatable whether the interaction of states should be 
represented by a conflict-cooperation scale, and that it may not always be right to 
conceptualize conflict and cooperation as a continuum, but rather as independent, yet related 
dimensions. This thesis agrees and uses only conflictual events as an indicator of American 
China policy. While it may be argued that the thesis is in danger of misinterpreting US 
policies toward China, by not paying attention to the cooperative elements of US policies, it 
may also be pointed out that this argument may go both ways. Should a state visit by the 
president of the US to China really be interpreted as a cooperative act if the US did not 
decrease, or even increased, the amount of conflictual policy acts during the same month? 
 
3.3 Data 
The data used for this thesis is the dataset “10 Million International Dyadic Events” (King and 
Lowe 2003a). The dataset contains event data on international events from 1990-2004. King 
and Lowe collected their dataset by using news reports from Reuters, after filtering out 
materials that were not news reports, as well as reports on stock exchange, exchange rates, 
shipping schedules, performance events and sports events. They then took advantage of a 
common journalistic practice used when writing news reports, in which the lead sentence 
summarizes the key points of the article: The software tool used, Virtual Research Associates, 
Inc. Reader is programmed to “read” these sentences and can “understand” the content by 
being able to recognize basic word patterns used.
11
 The software is then able to determine the 
sources and targets of events and categorizes the event into a 157-category typology called the 
Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) (King and Lowe 2003b:619-620; King and Lowe 
2006:1; Schrodt and Gerner 1994:826-830). In short, and as pointed out under 3.2, the reader 
is able to determine “who did what to whom, when.” 
                                                          
11
 For instance, while the first actor mentioned is the source of an event and the second actor is the target in most 
lead sentences, the opposite is true when the sentence is in passive voice. The VRA Reader is able to recognize 
both patterns and determine whether an actor is the source or target of the event (Schrodt and Gerner 1994:829). 
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King and Lowe has aggregated the data into monthly intervals, scored the events 
according to the Goldstein scale and, after merging the datasets, covered the period from 
January 1
st
 1990 to December 31
st
 2004. While the original datasets contained data on all 
states, only the events where USA was the source and China was the target, or vice versa, 
were kept. 
It should be noted that while other event datasets exist, these are often restricted to a 
geographical area, such as the “International Cooperation & Regional Conflicts Events Data 
1987-1999” (Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999), which is restricted to geographical regions, 
and/or to certain issues, such as the “Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset” (Raleigh, 
Linke, Hegre and Karlsen 2010), which is restricted to political violence data for developing 
states, and the “Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED)” (Engene 2007), which 
focuses on terrorism in Western Europe. Older datasets exist for international events, such as 
the “Conflict and Peace Data Bank” (Azar 1980), “World Events Interaction Survey” 
(McClelland 1971) and “US-Soviet-China events data” (Ashley 1980), but for the purposes of 
this thesis these should be seen as outdated compared to the King and Lowe dataset. 
 
3.4 Operationalization 
In the following section, it will be explained how the variables of the thesis were 
operationalized.
12
 First, however, some comments should be made about validity and 
reliability issues. Operationalization, the task of “measuring” ideas with facts, is done by 
developing an indicator that captures the systematized concept of interest, and thereby the 
background concept (Adcock and Collier 2001:530-531). According to Robert Adcock and 
David Collier, “measurement is valid when the scores […] can meaningfully be interpreted in 
terms of the systematized concept […] that the indicator seeks to operationalize” (Adcock and 
Collier 2001:531), or, phrased somewhat more straightforwardly by Gary King, Robert O. 
Keohane and Sidney Verba, when we are “…measuring what we think we are measuring” 
(King et al. 1994:25). If there is low validity, this essentially means that the wrong concept is 
being scored, which in turn renders the results of an analysis meaningless. In order to assess 
the operationalization of an indicator capturing the content of a systematized concept, Adcock 
                                                          
12
 As it is the norm to label some variables as “dependent” and others as “independent,” it should be noted that 
this would not make much sense when using a VAR model, as all the endogenous variables of such models are 
allowed to influence each other (See 3.5). 
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and Collier (2001:538) suggests asking two questions: “First, are key elements omitted from 
the indicator? Second, are inappropriate elements included in the indicator?” (Adcock and 
Collier 2001:538). At the same time, as King et al. (1994:26) point out, scholars need to make 
sure that the methods used for collecting data are reliable, meaning that applying the same 
method at a different time, or by a different scholar, should yield the same results. Efforts to 
increase the validity of a measure may threaten the reliability of a measure, and vice versa. 
For instance, while letting an expert of Sino-American relations assess how American foreign 
policy toward China has changed over time may yield estimates that seem more valid than 
simply using event data, it is likely that these estimates would be unreliable, as another expert 
may well have evaluated American policies differently. Where appropriate, comments will be 
made on the validity and reliability of the operationalization of the variables, as well as the 
collection of data, although some comments have already been made under 3.2 Measuring 
Foreign Policy: Event Data. 
3.4.1 American Public Opinion 
As outlined in the previous chapter, when discussing public opinion and foreign policy, what 
we should be concerned with is how American leaders perceive the power of the US, as well 
as how they perceive public opinion. The latter means that it is more important for this thesis 
to assess how foreign policymakers perceive public opinion, as opposed to how the interests 
and attitudes of public opinion actually changes. Furthermore, it was noted that politicians 
and administration officials use the media rather than polling data to learn what the public is 
concerned with, as well as how the public believes that the government should act. This 
means that it would be more prudent to study the relationship between how China and 
American China policy is discussed in the media and American China policy, rather than 
attempting to predict foreign policy from polling data.
13
 
 We are, of course, unable to know how leaders perceive public opinion. However, we 
can, by studying the material they use to form their perceptions, make the simple assumption 
that they will believe that the public is concerned about the issues prominent in the media, and 
that the views prominent in the media reflect dominant views among the public. Alternatively, 
                                                          
13
 Of course, it may be noted that there are no monthly polling data concerning how Americans view US China-
policy. 
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we can make the assumption that they believe that views prominent in the media are likely to 
become prominent among the public as well.
14
 
 In order to obtain an approximation of how public opinion on China policy was 
perceived by American policymakers for monthly intervals from 1990 to 2004, it was decided 
to conduct a quantitative content analysis on relevant material from the period. A first step 
was to decide the textual material on which the content analysis should be performed. While 
Carlos D. Ramirez (2011:5-6) simply counted the number of newspaper articles concerning 
China that used chosen keywords during a given month compared to that of other countries in 
order to determine the level of China bashing, such an approach seems inappropriate for the 
purposes of this thesis. Simply counting the number of newspaper articles that touch upon 
issues traditionally seen as problematic by Americans cannot really tell us much about what 
policies Americans would prefer their administration to pursue. Of course, it may be that all 
newspaper articles that mention human rights issues and “China” should be seen as 
advocating a more conflictual China policy, but it is not unreasonable to argue that some of 
the articles mentioning human rights issues may advocate a more cooperative approach, for 
instance by arguing that the US should seek to enhance the position of the Chinese middle 
class by allowing the Chinese to join the WTO. In other words: The content analysis needs to 
measure the conflictual sentiment of the texts, and it is assumed that the more negative 
sentiment in an article, the more negative and conflictual the public is assumed to be. 
 As noted by David P. Fan (1988:45-46), applying quantitative content analysis by 
simply using a general text analysis program and a prepared dictionary designed to assign 
individual words to predefined categories runs the risk of missing the fact that many words in 
the English language carry different meanings in different contexts, unless the program and 
dictionary used were designed to use disambiguation rules. However, the problem of 
ambiguation can also be reduced greatly by filtering out irrelevant material prior to the 
content analysis. The text material was gathered from Westlaw International, Business & 
News PRO US News Multibase (NEWSUS-PRO), which is a database containing all major 
newspapers of the US. First, it was decided to use editorials (and op-eds) only, as these are 
more likely to contain explicit opinions concerning American China policy. Second, only 
editorials being mainly concerned with China should be included; thus, both editorials that did 
not concern China at all, as well as editorials that mentioned China only in passing were 
                                                          
14
 This assumption is possibly less controversial, as it does not argue that policymakers believe that the media 
mirrors the contemporary or previous attitudes of the public, 
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excluded. This was done by demanding that the title of the editorial contained one of the 
following words: “CHINA”, “CHINE!”15, or “BEIJING”. While demanding that the editorials 
should contain one of these words may seem too restrictive, replacing this restriction with 
another demanding that the three words were merely mentioned in the first paragraphs was 
more problematic, as articles that did not concern China at all were included.
16
 Third, 
editorials were to be included if they concerned human rights, Sino-American defense and 
security issues, and/or the economic relationship. An editorial was presumed to concern 
human rights issues if it contained one of the following words or terms: “HUMAN RIGHTS”, 
“ARREST***” 17 , “DEMOCRA!”, “CHILD LABOR”, “TIANANMEN”, “REPRESS!”, 
“SUPPRESS!”, “OPPRESS!”, and “TIBET!” as long as this latter word was not mentioned 
together with “PLATEAU”18. In addition, the article had to contain the words “CHINA” or 
“BEIJING”.19 In order to be classified as concerning Sino-American defense and security 
issues, two conditions had to be satisfied (in addition to condition 1 and 2): First, the editorial 
had to have one reference to the US and/or American policymakers in one of the first 
paragraphs. One or more of the following words had to be mentioned for this purpose: “US”, 
“US”, “USA”, “AMERICA!”, “BUSH” 20 , “EAGLEBURGER”, “BAKER”, “QUAYLE”, 
“CHENEY”, “POWELL”, “CLINTON”, “GORE”, “ALBRIGHT”, and “WARREN 
CHRISTOPHER”21. Second, the editorial had to contain one or more reference to one of the 
following security/defense terms or issues: “DEFENSE”, “MILITARY”, “TAIWAN 
STRAIT”, “SOUTH CHINA SEA”, “ARMY”, “NAVY”, “AIR FORCE”, “SECURITY 
INTEREST”, “RISE OF CHINA” and “MISSILE!”, but not if the word “MISSILE!” 
preceded one of the following words: “SALE!”, “ROGUE”, “IRAN”, “PAKISTAN”, and 
“NORTH KOREA”. This last condition was to exclude articles that did not mainly concern 
Sino-American relations, even if they passed the first condition, and were mainly concerned 
                                                          
15
 The “!” is used to signify a stemming function, relieving the researcher of the need to write all possible 
inflections of a word, but in this case it was applied in order to use fewer characters, as the Westlaw search 
engine does not allow a search phrase to consist of more than 650 characters. 
16
 For instance, articles that concerned the South China Sea (but not China) were included. 
17
 The asterisk “*” was used rather than the “!” as use of the latter produced too many possible terms for the 
Westlaw search engine. 
18
 References to the Tibetan Plateau were never found to concern human rights issues, but rather the 
geographical location. 
19
 Note that the human rights issues did not have to include references to the US. This approach was chosen 
because many of the editorials on Chinese human rights issues clearly implied that something should be done by 
the US, without really mentioning the US or US policymakers in the editorial. 
20
 Note that this could be both the 41
st 
and the 43
rd 
President of the United States of America. 
21
 The full name of Warren Christopher was used in order to reduce the possibility of ambiguousness by using 
just his last name. 
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with other states buying Chinese missiles – these editorials seldom concerned the security 
aspect of Sino-American relations directly. In order to be classified as concerning the Sino-
American economic relationship, the editorial, first, had to contain one reference to the US or 
American policymakers, using the same keywords as for defense and security issues. Second, 
the editorial had to include one of the following words: “FINANC!”, “TRADE”, 
ECONOM**”, “FAKE”, “COUNTERFEIT”, “OIL”, “BUBBLE”, “RECESSION”, or 
“SPY!”. Alternatively, the editorial could include the words “CURRENCY” or “YUAN” if 
these words preceded the words “UNDERVALU!” or “MANIPU!”, thus including editorials 
concerned with claims that the Chinese currency (yuan) is undervalued or is being 
manipulated by the Chinese. Finally, editorials were only eligible if they were published in 
the period between (but not including) December 31
st
 1989 and January 1
st
 2005. When these 
instructions were plotted into the Westlaw search engine, the search yielded a result of 1887 
editorials.
22
 
After surveying the editorials to check that no unrelated editorials were included, the 
editorials were then downloaded and separated into 1887 text documents, which were then 
analyzed using the text analysis program “Yoshikoder” developed by Will Lowe (2009) 
together with the “Negative” list of words from the “Harvard IV-4” and “Lasswell” 
dictionaries of the “General Inquirer” (Stone et al. 1966).23 The Yoshikoder-program was 
used rather than the General Inquirer, as the former is able to upload and analyze several text 
files at the same time. By using Microsoft Excel, the results could be grouped into monthly 
intervals where the value described the mean number of negative words per editorial during 
that month. The result was converted to a spreadsheet format, which could be inserted into the 
Stata data editor. Months during which no editorials were written, five in all, had been given 
the temporary value “0”. As no editorials used zero negative words, this distinguished these 
months from the other months. 
                                                          
22
 When entering the search in the Westlaw search engine, and choosing the option that duplicate versions of the 
same editorial should not be displayed, the search yielded 1888 editorials. However, upon surveying the 
editorials more closely, it was found that one of the editorials was a duplicate of another editorial. Accordingly, 
the duplicate was excluded from the analysis. 
23
 The idea was that editorials arguing in favor of more conflictual policies would be built up of more negative 
words, as these would be used both to describe Chinese policies, describe (allegedly) poor state of American 
China-policies, and the policies that should be implemented (because these would be associated with 
confrontations). By comparison, editorials arguing in favor of less conflictual policies might use as many 
negative words to describe American policies, but should use comparably fewer negative words to describe 
contemporary Chinese policies as well as the policies that should be implemented (as these would be more 
associated with cooperation). 
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After the data were inserted into the Stata dataset, the question of how to interpret 
months with the value “0”, that is, during which no editorials concerning China were 
published, had to be answered. In other words, how do these months influence the perception 
of American policymakers of public opinion? It is argued here that these months should be 
interpreted as providing no new information about public opinion to policymakers, meaning 
that the perceived public opinion should remain unchanged. Accordingly, months with the 
value “0” were given the same value as the preceding month. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics, PubOp 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
PubOp 180 0,02480 0,00533 0,00595 0,04131 
 
Figure 1: Mean negative words per editorial per month over time 
 
Table 1 shows some statistics of the variable PubOp, which is the mean percentage of 
negative words during a month (the value “1” equals 100%). As shown, the mean percentage 
of negative words during the period was 2.48%; during the month with the lowest ratio of 
negative words, there were no more than 0.595% negative words; and during the month with 
the highest amount of negative words, there were 4.131%. While these proportions may 
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intuitively seem to be small, one should remember that “…50% of all tokens in English text 
are contentless grammatical function words” (Lowe 2006:3). Figure 1 illustrates how the 
variable changes over the period. 
However, it seems somewhat unlikely that policymakers are able to assess what kind 
of policies the American public would prefer simply from noting the percentage of negative 
words in an editorial. To be more precise: It is seen as unlikely that a policymaker would 
interpret the public opinion similarly in all months with a mean of 4% negative words per 
editorial. The percentage of negative words is not likely to be perceived as corresponding with 
an imagined percentage of the American public preferring conflictual policies. Rather, it is 
likely that the degree of negative sentiment in an editorial should be seen as relative to that of 
other editorials. Thus, the policymaker is likely to note that the degree of negative and 
conflictual sentiments in one editorial is higher than that of another editorial, and furthermore 
that the general sentiment in the editorials during one month is either more or less negative 
than the general sentiment during the preceding month. Accordingly, while a policymaker 
may not assess the public opinion similarly during all months with a mean of 4% negative 
words, it may be that he/she will assess the changes of 2 percentage points similarily. As any 
inducements to change American China- policy because of the public are likely to stem from 
changes in public opinion, the variable was recoded in order to show changes from the 
previous month. The main statistics of this variable can be found in table 5, which displays 
key values of 
                        
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics, dPubOp 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Kurtosis Skewness 
dPubOp 179 -0,0000251 0,006 -0,019 0,0168 3,257 -0,1228 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in the mean negative words per month, which should 
be seen as an indicator of changes in public opinion. 
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Figure 2: Changes in mean negative words per editorial per month over time 
 
Some comments should be made about concerns of validity and reliability that are 
especially important for computer-assisted content analysis. First, one may question whether a 
text analysis program is able to “read” texts properly, challenging the so-called semantic 
validity of the content analysis. As Krippendorff (1994:257-261) points out, human coders 
can read and code texts better than computer programs can. Accordingly, it might have been 
better to use human coders to determine whether editorials were in favor of more conflictual 
policies, more cooperative policies, or neither. However, as the use of human coders demands 
that the researcher developing the coding does not participate in the coding, such a process 
would demand hiring assistants for coding, who would also have to be trained – in other 
words, a far more resource-demanding task. In addition, the use of human coders brings up 
the question of reliability (different coders may not code the editorials similarly), a problem 
that is non-existent when using computers; it is impossible for a computer to code texts 
unreliably (Krippendorff 2004:259). More importantly, while Krippendorff (2004:259-261) is 
skeptical of computer coding in general, he does accepts its use for the construction of simple 
variables, given that the software or dictionary used is developed for such a purpose: Indeed, 
the Negative list of words from the “Harvard IV-4” dictionary used here is often used to 
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determine the degree of negative sentiment of news articles, thus suggesting its so-called 
functional validity (Krippendorff 2004:332-333).
24
 
The assumption above, that policymakers infer public opinion sentiments from mass 
media, seems unproblematic, as Entman has asserted such a relationship. What is more 
problematic, however, is that there is no way to validate that policymakers do, in fact, infer 
public opinion in the way assumed here. Fan (1988) makes far more complicated assumptions 
in order to predict actual public opinion from mass-media coverage, and has been able to 
make accurate predictions of public opinion as a consequence (Krippendorff 2004:302). 
However, as there are no repeated polls on American China policy available, it is not possible 
to ascertain whether the approximations of public opinion used in this thesis correspond 
accurately to actual public opinion. What is worse, in terms of evaluating validity, is that the 
stated objective of the operationalizing process is not to predict actual public opinion, but 
rather, the perceived public opinion. In other words, we would have to know how the majority 
of the policymakers perceived the public, and not the actual attitudes held by the public. This, 
then, concerns what Klaus Krippendorff (2004:317) calls the methodological obstacle to 
validation, because there is no independent evidence to what is inferred. If there were any 
evidence with which the validity could be established, there would be no need to use content 
analysis in the first place. However, the fact that the results can be seen as functionally valid, 
as argued above, is one way of overcoming this obstacle (Krippendorff 2004:332-333). 
Furthermore, it is the view of this thesis that the indicator for public opinion (or perceived 
public opinion) presented here appeals to face validity. Given the fact that policymakers rely 
on the media to make assumptions about the public, it seems probable that articles that are 
more negative would lead the policymaker to believe that the public was more negative and in 
favor of conflictual policies as well.
25
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 For one example, see Tetlock et al. 2008 
25
 For those who remain skeptical about the operationalization process, it may be appropriate to reiterate the 
words of Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba: “An important topic is worth studying even if very 
little information is available…Because the social world changes rapidly, analyses that help us understand those 
changes require that we describe them and seek to understand them, contemporaneously, even when uncertainty 
about our conclusions is high” (1994:6). This is in line with what is called social validity by Krippendorff 
(2004:314), i.e. that a research result is valid because it concerns an important issue. However, and as argued 
above, the findings of the word count are not seen as sufficiently non-valid, as to invoke this “last line of 
defense.” 
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3.4.2 American Foreign Policy Toward China 
Using the dataset “10 Million International Dyadic Events,” the variable for US foreign policy 
toward China was constructed in the following way: The variable for conflictual events where 
USA was the source and China was the target of the event, understood as an approximation of 
American China policy for the time period, was found to suffer from heavy kurtosis (20,30) 
and skewness (3,12). In order to make sure the variable was normally distributed, which is 
necessary for the statistical methods applied in this thesis, the variable was transformed by 
square root transformation, 
        √              
where               was the original variable, constructed from GNCUM in the original 
dataset. 
Figure 3: American China policy over time. 
 
 Figure 3 illustrates how American China-policies have changed over time. For most of 
the months, the square root of the Goldstein score varies between 0, which should be 
interpreted as meaning that no conflictual events were implemented during that month, and 4, 
which equals a Goldstein score of 4
2
=16. One56 of the most noticeable features of the graph 
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is the spike for April 2001, where the square footed Goldstein score is 10,780, which equals a 
Goldstein score of 10,780
2
=116,208. During this month, an American EP-3 reconnaissance 
aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter jet, which crashed, killing the Chinese pilot. The 
American aircraft was forced to land on a Chinese airbase, and the political aftermath of the 
collision became a major crisis for the two countries (Sutter 2010:41). The event data seems 
to instill face validity in the way it describes the relationship in other ways as well. Consider, 
for example, the increased conflictual policies during early 1996, when the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis of 1995-1996 was at its height; the increased conflictual policies during early 1994, 
when tension rose over Most Favored Nation status and Chinese human rights issues; the 
decreased degree of conflictual policies during 1997 and 1998, when both Chinese and 
American state leaders made an effort to decrease tensions and improve the relationship 
between the two states; and, finally, the increased conflictual policies from 1999 to early 2001, 
following the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 (though this incident 
caused more conflictual policies from the Chinese side), increased tensions in the Taiwan 
Strait as Taiwan president Lee Ten-hui asserted that Taiwan was a separate state and 
allegations of Chinese espionage in the US against US nuclear facilities (Sutter 2010:137-
143). 
As the variable for public opinion is measured in changes, it seems logical that the 
variable for American foreign policies towards China should be measured in changes as well:  
                        
Table 6: Variable Overview, dAmPol 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Kurtosis Skewness 
dAmPol 179 0,018 2,408 -4,901 7,078 2,598 0,365 
 
Figure 4 and Table 7 illustrate how the changes in American foreign policy toward China 
have changed over time. From the table we may read that the largest change in American 
China policy was 7,078 which, when squared (7,078
2
=50,098), equals a change from no 
negative events (policies) to implementing five policy acts of the most extreme kind 
(“Goldstein scale -10 events”, equal to engaging in a war). This clearly illustrates that we 
should be careful to translate scores based on the Goldstein directly. As Goldstein scores are 
accumulated for each month, this simply means that the US implemented conflictual policies 
toward China during a month that cumulatively changed the Goldstein score with 50,098 from 
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the previous month, not that the US implemented policies equal to engaging in five military 
conflicts against China. 
Figure 4: Changes in American China policy over time 
 
 As pointed out under 1.5, 3.2, and 3.4, the thesis is concerned with foreign policy acts, 
and it should therefore not be seen as problematic that it does not include concepts often 
associated with “foreign policy”, such as defined under 2.6. Accordingly, and with the 
exceptions noted under 3.2, the operationalization of American foreign policy toward China, 
seems to be valid, as well as reliable, given that the same data, methods, and procedures are 
used. 
 
3.4.3 Chinese Foreign Policy Toward the US 
The variable for Chinese foreign policies against the US was constructed in a similar way as 
the variable for American foreign policies. After square root transforming the variable, the 
variable ChiPol was constructed:
26
 
                                                          
26
 The variable ChiPol was constructed using the variable negCHINAvUSA, which was constructed from 
GNCUM. 
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Figure 5: Chinese policies toward the US over time 
 
Figure 5 illustrates how Chinese policies toward the US have changed over the period. Notice 
that the scaling for degree of conflictual policies differs slightly from Figure 3. As for Figure 
3, the most noticeable peak seems to be the EP-3 incident in April 2001. For the rest of the 
period, the policies seem to follow mainly the same ebbs and flows as the American policies 
with an increased degree of conflictual policies in early 1996, a somewhat decreased degree 
of conflict in 1997 and 1998, but a steep increase in conflictual policies in 1999, especially for 
May 1999, which was the month of the embassy bombing in Belgrade. Notice also the peak in 
September 1992, which coincides with President George H. W. Bush notifying China that he 
would sell 150 F-16A/B fighters and three Patriot Modified Air Defense System (MADS) fire 
units to Taiwan, which caused Beijing to criticize Washington, suspend participation in talks 
on arms sales to the Middle East, reject US proposals for a human rights commission as well 
as hint at further actions (Lye and Bo 2010:5-6). 
 Similar to the variables for American public opinion and American foreign policies, 
the variable ChiPol was differenced and should be understood as a variable measuring change 
in Chinese policies toward the US: 
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Figure 6: Changes in Chinese policies toward the US over time 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics, dChiPol 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Kurtosis Skewness 
dChiPol 179 -0,0044 2,445 -5,701 7,229 2,832 0,068 
 
Figure 6 and table 7 illustrate how the changes in Chinese policies toward the US have 
changed over time. The largest change in squared Goldstein score is 7,229, which equals a 
Goldstein score of 7,229
2
=52,258. It may also be mentioned that smaller changes seem to 
follow smaller changes, while larger changes seem to follow larger changes. Other than that, 
and similar to Figure 4, changes toward more cooperative policies seem to follow changes 
toward more conflictual policies, though it should be noted there seems to have been a brief 
period following September 2001 when Chinese changes seemed to be less volatile. 
 As the variable for Chinese foreign policies toward the US is constructed in the same 
way as the variable for American policies, it can be assumed that the discussion concerning 
validity and reliability should hold for this variable as well. 
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3.4.4 Administration Variables – Exogenous Variables 
As pointed out by Holsti in the first chapter, it is highly probable that the impact of the 
public on US foreign policy varies over presidents. Some presidents may be less susceptible 
than others to the pressure from public opinion. Dummy variables are included to account for 
such variation. The period from January 1990 to January 1993 covers the presidency of 
President George H. W. Bush, February 1993 to January 2001 covers the presidency of 
President William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton, while the period from January 2001 to December 
2004 covers the presidency of President George W. Bush. At the same time, while it is 
possible that the susceptibility of the public to the impact of American and Chinese policies 
varies across different presidents, American presidents should probably not have a direct 
impact on Chinese foreign policy. Accordingly, the dummy variables for US presidents are 
restricted from having a direct impact on Chinese policies in the VAR and SVAR model 
below. Finally, these variables are kept exogenous to the rest of the model. 
 
3.4.5 Exogenous Events–  Exogenous Variables 
The idea of using a VAR analysis is to ascertain how variables endogenous to each other 
impact on each other over time. However, as may be clear from the presentation of the 
variables for American and Chinese foreign policies above, some of the events having the 
greatest impacts on the policies should not be seen as endogenous to the relationship. It seems 
quite obvious that the peak in April 2001 was caused by the EP-3 incident. However, the 
incident itself was not caused by any design of the policies of either China or the US – most 
experts agree that it was an accident. Furthermore, unless one accepts the view of some 
Chinese nationalists, the Belgrade embassy bombing of May 1999 should be seen as such an 
accident as well. Finally, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, followed by an upswing 
in Sino-American relations, should not be seen as being caused by any of the countries either 
(Sutter 2010:145). Accordingly, these three events should a priori be seen as exogenous to the 
Sino-American relationship, and accordingly, should have only an exogenous impact 
(although the impact may have lingered). While other exogenous incidents do exist, they are 
not seen as influential enough to change the event data score for individual months 
significantly. 
 To account for these exogenous impacts, three dummy variables (embassy, ep3, and 
alq) were constructed. They were given the value “1” during the months May 1999, April 
2001, and September 2001 respectively, and the value “0” for the rest of the period. 
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3.5 Model 1: Vector Autoregression 
Quantitative studies based on cross-sectional data need to make assumptions about the 
direction of causal influence, as the data were collected simultaneously, leaving the researcher 
without a way of knowing whether the assumed cause preceded its impact. Researchers using 
time series data, which contains information on how the values of the variables have changed 
over time, can – to  some extent – examine whether the assumed cause preceded the assumed 
impact (Bryman 2004:76). 
Time series are defined by Ole-Jørgen Skog as “…repeated observations of the same 
observation unit, usually over a longer period of time” (Skog 2009:324; my translation). As 
certain phenomena, such as the conflictual tendencies of foreign policy, usually vary over 
time, time series data can be applied to elucidate a causal relationship between variables, by 
assessing whether changes in one variable can be expected to lead to changes in another 
variable. However, the use of such data poses challenges unique to this approach. In general, 
whenever two variables, A and B, correlate, we can assume a) A caused B, b) B caused A, or 
c) a third factor C caused both A and B. For time series, a fourth alternative is possible, 
namely that d) A and B are correlated, simply because both phenomena develop 
systematically over time, without any of the two causing the other (Skog 2009:324-325). 
While techniques of time series analysis allow the researcher to account for such problems 
(see Chapter Five), the greatest challenge to this analysis is the probable presence of 
endogeneity. 
As noted under 3.1, Entman points out that simply noting correlation between public 
opinion and foreign policy is insufficient, as it is very likely that there is an endogenous 
relationship between the two. When reciprocal relationships between the variables are likely, 
and when there is uncertainty about the length of the time lags, the use of Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) methodology is appropriate, as it allows the analyst to relieve 
assumptions of non-endogeneity, as well as the need to assign time lags a priori.
27
 While 
Christopher Sims (1980) made VAR models popular among economists, the method has also 
been used successfully by students of international relations and foreign policy analysis as 
well (see for example Freeman et al. (1989), McGinnis and Williams (1989), Goldstein and 
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 It may be noted that VAR models that include exogenous variables are sometimes called VARX models. 
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Freeman (1991), DeRouen and Peake (2010) and Ramirez (2011)).
28
 VAR may be seen as a 
multivariate approach to “Granger causality,” which, although it is based on predictive power, 
may allow the analyst to infer something about causality: 
“If   ( | ̅)     ( | ̅   ̅) we say that Y is causing X, denoted by Yt => Xt. We say that Yt is 
causing Xt if we are better able to predict Xt using all available information than if the information apart 
from Yt had been used” (Granger 1969:428). 
In VAR “[e]ach dependent variable is regressed on lagged values of itself, as well as lagged 
values of the other dependent variables in the system”(DeRouen and Peake 2010:200). Due to 
collinearity issues caused by multiple lags, Granger causation tests are used to determine 
whether there is a significant relationship between the variables seen as endogenous, and rely 
on simulations of the variables to estimate the direction of the impact (Freeman et al. 1989; 
DeRouen and Peake 2010:194, 200-201). Criticism has been directed at the use of VAR, 
claiming that the approach is atheoretical. While DeRouen and Peake seem to concede the 
point, they maintain that its use is warranted whenever “…theory suggests weak or competing 
a priori distinctions…” (DeRouen and Peake 2010:200). Freeman et al., for their part, argue 
that VAR modelers need to “…rely on a priori reasoning to decide which variables to include 
in their systems and to order their variables in innovation accounting. In these ways, VAR 
modeling is theoretically grounded. And the charge that VAR modeling is atheoretical is 
                                                          
28
 As an example of how VAR and structural VAR models are used comparatively more often in econometric 
analysis than in foreign policy analysis, much of the methodological literature used in this thesis has been written 
with challenges towards econometric analysis in mind. 
𝑦𝑡  𝐶(𝐿)𝑦𝑡  + 𝑢𝑡 
𝐸(𝑢𝑡)  0 
𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡
′)  𝛬 
𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑠
′)  0 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 
𝐸(𝑦𝑡𝑢𝑠
′)  0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡  𝑠 
VAR models have the following form: 
𝐶(𝐿)  𝐶 + 𝐶 𝐿 + 𝐶3 𝐿
 + .. . 
where 𝑦𝑡  is an mx1 vector of variables; 𝐶𝑖 is a mxm matrix of coefficients, i = 1, 2, . . ., j; 𝑢𝑡 is an mx1 
white noise vector; 𝛬 is the mxm variance- covariance matrix for 𝑢𝑡; ' denotes transpose; L is the lag 
operator; and E is the expectation operator (Freeman et al. 1989:844). 
 
Table 8: VAR Modeling 
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unfair” (Freeman et al. 1989:855).29 More relevant to this thesis, it should be recalled from the 
previous chapter that theory explicitly suggests an endogenous relationship, thus implying the 
need to use VAR models. 
As mentioned under 3.1, James D. Hamilton (1994:305-309) warns that, while 
Granger-causality tests can be useful for testing the predictability of time series, such tests 
cannot necessarily be used to test for causal relationships and the causal direction between 
two arbitrary series. However, if used in conjunction with theoretical assumptions, for 
example if it is reasonable to assume that no missing variable could be seen as “Granger-
causing” changes in public opinion and real world events, then it would be possible to make 
inferences about the causal relationship between the variables. In this way, both VAR analysis 
and SVAR analysis (below), are, to some extent, less threatened by threats to internal validity 
that arise from uncertainty about the direction of causal inference (Lund 2002:116-120). At 
the same time, however, it should be noted that the use of time-series data does not remove 
the direction problem, as noted under both 3.1 above, and 4.1 below. 
 The VAR model applied in this thesis will treat the indicators of foreign policy, public 
opinion and real-world events as potentially endogenous variables, and assume that the 
variables described in 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 are exogenous. Including exogenous variables requires 
that the equation from the table above is rewritten as: 
     +  ( )    +    
, where    is a vector of deterministic components. 
Equation for changes in American foreign policies toward China: 
           
+∑             
+∑              
+∑  3          +      +         +     +         +     
+   
    
Equation for changes in Chinese policies toward the US: 
                                                          
29
 It has been noted “…VAR can be viewed as a multivariate extension of the Granger […] approach to causal 
inference”: “A variable X is said to ‘Granger cause’ another variable Y, if ‘Y can be better predicted from the 
past of X and Y together than the past of Y alone, other relevant information being used in the prediction” 
(Freeman 1983:328). 
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+∑             
+∑              
+∑  3          +     +         +     +   
      
Equation for changes in American public opinion: 
         3 
+∑ 3          
+∑ 3            
+∑ 33          +      +         +     +         +     
+   
     
 
Finally, and according to Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman (1991:20, 23), we 
should also investigate the possibility that states and state leaders form rational expectations, 
or perceptions, of how other states are likely to act, and that they will not change their policies 
unless the other state behaves more conflictually or cooperatively than expected. In the VAR 
model, such expectations may be modeled as the previous behavior of a state: states form 
their expectations by observing the historical behavior of other states and assume that they 
will behave accordingly in the future. If states behave unexpectedly, this will be shown in the 
error term of the model. Therefore, if error terms are correlated across the equations, we can 
interpret this as states reacting to the unexpected moves of other states. In other words, if US 
foreign policymakers have formed expectations of how they expect China to react to a certain 
event – either exogenous or endogenous to the Sino-American relationship – there is a 
possibility that they will not change their policies unless the Chinese react either more 
conflictual or more cooperative than expected. 
 
3.6 Model 2: Structural Vector Autoregression 
As Hamilton points out, vector autoregression largely is descriptive in describing the 
relationship between the variables and does not make use of “…prior theoretical ideas about 
how these variables are expected to be related, and therefore cannot be used to test our 
theories or interpret the data…” (Hamilton 1994:324). In order to obtain estimates on how the 
variables impact on each other, a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) needs to be 
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identified and estimated, as such a model is able to account for the impact of 
contemporaneous values on the independent variables. As Hamilton (1994:327) explains
30
, 
and as Steven K. Buigut and Neven T. Valev (2005:2123) elegantly sums up, a VAR-model, 
such as the one used above, can be seen as a reduced form of the SVAR. This means, in short, 
that it is possible to identify the SVAR model by using information obtained when running a 
reduced VAR-model. However, as there are more parameters in a SVAR than in a VAR, it is 
necessary to impose restrictions on the model: not all variables can have a contemporaneous 
impact on the other variables. Some of the variables must merely be seen as products of the 
lagged variables, and the error terms must be assumed orthogonal. In econometrics, 
macroeconomic theory is applied in order to make claims as to which variables should be 
restricted from interacting contemporaneously with other variables. Here, the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter Two will be used to specify the statistical model. 
 As noted above, for the VAR model, a general VAR model can be written: 
     +  ( )    +    
As may be noted, this equation does not seem to allow for any contemporaneous impacts of 
the endogenous variables on   , only of lagged variables. However, such contemporaneous 
impacts are hidden within the vector   . Accordingly, it is assumed that   , consists of both 
the correlated contemporaneous impacts,  , and the errors,   , which are expected to be 
uncorrelated across the equations (orthogonal). As noted above, the residuals in VAR models 
can be used to model the expectations of the actors. In SVAR models, this interpretation of 
the error term is more explicit. By using so-called impulse response functions, it is possible to 
model how a “shock” (which may be interpreted as an unexpected change) to one variable 
affects the other variables. This, then, makes it easier to test the relationship between the 
variables (Lütkepol and Breiting 1996). As neoclassical realism explicitly notes the 
importance of perceptions and shocks, this theoretical approach is appropriate for such 
analysis. 
 The equation above can be reformulated: 
      +  ( )    +    
                                                          
30
 Hamilton’s explanation is too detailed to be presented here. For more information, see Hamilton (1994:309-
350) 
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Here,        and     
    . In order to obtain the estimates of how the endogenous 
variables influence each other contemporaneously, contained in matrix  , it is necessary to 
impose restrictions. This is often done by imposing a lower-triangular structure on the matrix, 
often by using so-called Cholesky decomposition. This allows us to impose the necessary 
amount of restrictions on the matrix, so we are left with no more than (
    
 
) elements that 
are not determined a priori, which in this case equals imposing (
3  3
 
  ) elements.31 The 
instantaneous equations are achieved by the matrices A and B, as: 
 ( )     +     
        
 This, however, entails using a theoretical framework to determine which variables should 
have a contemporaneous impact on the other variables, and which should merely be 
influenced by the exogenous variables and the lagged values of the endogenous variables 
(Loría, Sánchez and Salgado 2010). 
 As the theory argues that American China policy should be, first and foremost, 
influenced by Chinese policies toward the US, it seems appropriate to argue that changes in 
Chinese policies toward the US should not be seen as contemporaneously affected by either 
American public opinion or American policy toward China. Rather, changes in Chinese 
policies are assumed to be the product of previous changes in American China policy and 
American public opinion. Changes in American public opinion, on the other hand, are 
affected by contemporaneous changes in Chinese policies, but not by changes in the 
contemporaneous US policy toward China. Finally, changes in American policy toward China 
are affected by contemporaneous changes in both Chinese policies toward the US and 
American public opinion. Accordingly, the matrices needed for the contemporary estimation 
may be written as: 
[
 0 0
 3  0
     3  
] [
  
     
  
     
  
   
]  [
   0 0
0  33 0
0 0    
] [
  
     
  
     
  
   
] 
 
                                                          
31
 n  being the number of endogenous parameters of the model. For a more detailed and technical explanation of 
the identification of SVAR models, see Gottschalk 2001. 
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3.7 Table of Hypotheses 
Having established what methods will be used to answer the research question, the table of 
hypotheses presented in Chapter Two is updated, as it is now possible to suggest how the 
hypotheses might be falsified. 
 
Table 9: Stated Hypotheses 
Number Stated Hypothesis 
H1a Changes in American public opinion Granger-cause changes in 
American foreign policy toward China. 
H1b Changes in American public opinion toward a more conflictual 
(cooperative) approach increase the probability of a change 
toward more conflictual (cooperative) policies by the United 
States toward China.  
H2a Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward the US Granger-
cause changes in American foreign policies toward China 
H2b Changes in Chinese foreign policy toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward the United States increase the 
probability of a change toward more conflictual (cooperative) 
policies by the United States toward China. 
H2c Changes in American foreign policies toward China are caused 
by changes in Chinese foreign policies toward China deviating 
from expectations.  
H3a Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward the United States 
Granger-cause changes in American public opinion. 
H3b Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward the United States increase the 
probability of American public opinion changing toward 
supporting a more conflictual (cooperative) approach. 
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H4a Changes in American foreign policies toward China Granger-
cause changes in American public opinion. 
H4b Changes in American foreign policies toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward China increase the probability of 
American public opinion changing toward supporting a more 
conflictual (cooperative) approach. 
H5 Changes in American foreign policies toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward China do not increase the 
probability of subsequent changes in American foreign policy 
toward China. 
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4.0 Results and Analysis 
The following chapter analyses the empirical data of the previous chapter and assesses how 
the data conforms to the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Two. The first section 
applies the VAR-model to the data and analyses the result both by testing them with a 
Granger causation Wald test and by analyzing the coefficients. The second section applies the 
SVAR-model, which allow us to illustrate how shocks to the variables affect other variables. 
Following this section is a discussion of the results and the implications for the hypotheses 
and the theories described in Chapter Two. 
4.1 Model 1: Vector Autoregression 
The VAR model is constructed using the variables dAmPol, dChiPol and dPubOp, where 
dAmPol and dChiPol are variables describing the degree of conflict in the American and 
Chinese policies.
32
 The results of the Granger Wald tests for the equations of the vector 
autoregression are displayed in 10: 
Table 10: Granger causality Wald tests 
The null hypothesis is that the independent variable does not Granger-cause the dependent 
variable, and a significance level of 95% is chosen. As the test results imply, the null 
hypothesis that changes in public opinion (dPubOp) does not Granger-cause changes in the 
American China policy (dAmPol) must be rejected. At the same time, the test results also 
support the hypothesis that changes in the levels of conflict/cooperation in Chinese foreign 
policy toward the US (dChiPol) Granger-cause changes in American China policy. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that changes in American China policy cause changes in 
Chinese policy toward the US. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there are no indications that 
changes in American China policy Granger-causes changes in American public opinion. 
However, the results do indicate that changes in Chinese foreign policy toward the US 
                                                          
32
 Information on how the appropriate lag length was chosen is provided in Chapter Five. 
Dependent Independent Χ2 Significance 
dChiPol dAmPol 15,157 0,019* 
dChiPol dPubOp 10,663 0,099 
dPubOp dAmPol 7,1969 0,303 
dPubOp dChiPol 24,689 0,000*** 
dAmPol dChiPol 21,237 0,002** 
dAmPol dPubOp 24,061 0,001*** 
* p<0,05, ** p<0,01, ***p<0,001 
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Granger-cause changes in US public opinion. Less surprisingly, the results imply that changes 
in American public opinion do not Granger-cause changes in Chinese foreign policy.  
As the concept of Granger causality may seem to imply that the thesis tests causation 
statistically, a couple of comments should be made. First, Granger causality does not imply 
causation as defined by Gerring in the previous chapter. It does not test causation as such. 
Rather, Granger causality is used to investigate whether one variable can forecast another 
variable. However, the Granger causality test may uncover causal relationships. By testing 
whether it is a coincidence that the content of editorials in their assessments of China and 
American China policy in the months prior to the US government can be used to forecast 
changes in US China policy, we are also testing whether it is probable that the perceived 
public opinion may have had an impact on US politicians. However, Granger causality may 
also be found whenever a variable can be seen as measuring an expectation of change in 
another variable (Hamilton 1994:302-309). From the model above, consider how a 
counterfactual situation where the American public opinion did Granger-cause Chinese 
foreign policy could be explained: It is conceivable that American newspapers (and the 
American public) expects changes in Chinese policies toward the US, for instance by noting 
the that there is a an issue in the Sino-American relationship that has to be solved the 
following month, t+i. If China is expected to adopt a conflictual (cooperative) stance on the 
issue, one may assume that the editorials will be more negative (positive) in their assessments 
of China and that they will advocate conflictual (cooperative) policies in return. In this 
scenario, the American public opinion does not cause Chinese policies, even if it does 
Granger-cause it. This particular scenario does not, presumably, hold for the Granger 
causation of US policy by the American public opinion: While the American public opinion 
and American editors can be assumed to be no less capable of predicting US foreign policy 
than Chinese foreign policy (of course, they are likely to be more capable, as policymakers 
might attempt to influence the public and thus make their intentions known) it does not, as 
stated in Chapter Two, follow that the public will prefer the same policies as the 
administration. 
 As DeRouen and Peakes (2010:201) notes, coefficient estimates obtained when using 
VARs are unreliable due to high collinearity. However, the signs of the coefficient estimates 
may, according to Xiaojun Li (2009:201), be used as preliminary analysis in order to establish 
whether there is positive or negative relationship between the variables (Li 2009:201). 
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 Table 11, which presents the signs of the coefficients of the VAR model, allows us to 
test some of the assumptions of the hypotheses. First, when studying table 11, it becomes 
clear that the foreign policy of the US toward China does not seem to be characterized by 
inertia: While the present Sino-American policies of the US are influenced by the policies of 
the US during the previous five months, the sign of the coefficients are negative. This means 
that changes toward more conflictual policies by the US tend to be followed by changes 
toward more cooperative policies, which in turn are followed by changes toward more 
conflictual policies. This is partly a result of the data being stationary, but how can this be 
interpreted? One possible explanation is that US policymakers for some reason prefer to keep 
the relationship toward China stable, i.e. keeping China at arm’s length, while attempting to 
prevent the relationship from deteriorating. If this interpretation is correct, then policymakers, 
having been forced to pursue more conflictual (cooperative) policies during one month (for 
some reason), will tend to attempt to follow more cooperative (conflictual) policies during the 
subsequent month in order to improve the bilateral relationship. 
 
Table 11: Condensed Results from VAR-model on Foreign Policy and Public Opinion 
 Another noticeable feature of table 11 is that the changes in US China policy are 
correlated with changes in Chinese policy toward the US two, four and five months earlier. It 
may intuitively seem somewhat strange that there is a two-month lag before changes in 
 dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp 
dAmPolLag L1(-), L2(-), L3(-), 
 L4(-), L5(-) 
L1(+), L3(+) None 
dChiPolLag L2(+), L4(+), L5(+) L1(-), L2(-), L3(-), 
 L4(-), L5(-) 
L3(-), L4(-), L5(-), 
 L6(-) 
dPubOpLag L1(+), L2(+) L1(+) L1(-), L2(-), L3(-) 
Note: Li is the i
th
 lagged value of the endogenous variable. The variables in the table are 
significant at a <0.05 level. (+) denotes that the variable coefficient has a positive sign, while 
(-) denotes a coefficient with a negative sign. 
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Chinese foreign policy cause changes in US foreign policy. One explanation may, of course, 
be that American foreign policymakers simply do not adjust the foreign policies of the US 
immediately, but take their time before reciprocating changes in Chinese foreign policy. 
Another explanation may be that the level of the aggregation used here masks how fast 
American foreign policy changes according to the foreign policies of other states. As the data 
used here are aggregated at a monthly level, they do not allow us to trace changes in policies 
at the daily or weekly level. It may be that US foreign policymakers reciprocate changes in 
Chinese policy weeks, days or even hours after they perceive such a change, but the event 
data available is not yet aggregated at such a level as to make such an analysis possible. This 
problem is augmented by the fact that the reduced VAR model used here does not allow 
changes in the variables to impact the contemporary values of other variables.
33
 Accordingly, 
it is possible that there is some immediate reciprocation, as well as some reciprocation that 
takes longer time to implement into US policies, hence the two-month lag. 
Table 11 also shows how American China policy is influenced by public opinion 
during the last two months. First, this seems to support the main hypothesis of the thesis: 
American foreign policymaking seems to be influenced by public opinion, as changes in 
American China policy can be forecasted by knowing the changes in American public opinion 
during the previous month. If public opinion changes toward more conflictual policies, 
American China policy tend to shift toward more conflictual policies during the following 
month. Moreover, the results in table 2 imply that policymakers are influenced by public 
opinion two months prior. At the most basic level, of course, this means that a shift toward 
more conflictual policies will lead to policies that are more conflictual two months later. 
However, this also means that if public opinion shifts toward more conflictual policies during 
one month, and more cooperative policies during the next month, American policymakers 
consider both changes when formulating their foreign policies. This is interesting because it 
implies that policymakers are not influenced simply by the changes of the previous month. As 
changes in public opinion tend to fluctuate, the results indicate that policymakers may 
remember that the public seemed to have held a different conception about what would 
constitute appropriate policies toward China, and that there may be little to gain by pursuing a 
foreign policy that is too considerate of the contemporary public opinion. 
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 Which is why the structural vector autoregression model is used below. 
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For the other two equations, dChiPol and dPubOp, describing changes in Chinese 
foreign policy and changes in American public opinion respectively, a couple of comments 
may be made as well. The Chinese foreign policies toward the US seem to follow the same 
processes as US China policy, with changes toward more cooperative policies being followed 
by changes toward more conflictual policies, and vice versa. It is not unlikely that the 
explanations suggested for this behavior may apply for the Chinese case as well. Moreover, 
Chinese America-policies are influenced by the policies pursued by American policymakers 
toward China with a one- and a three-month lag. As the coefficient is positive, this may be 
interpreted as meaning that more conflictual American policies cause Chinese policymakers 
to change their policies toward the US to be more conflictual during the following month, as 
well as the third month. There is one significant lag for the relationship between American 
public opinion and Chinese foreign policy, but as the Granger causality Wald test did not find 
any evidence of Granger causality, this relationship need not be discussed here. 
As table 11 makes evident, there are no significant lags for the impact of Amerian 
China policy on American public opinion. This is not surprising, as the Granger causality 
Wald test did not find any evidence of US China policy granger-causing American public 
opinion. This is important finding, as it indicates that the public does not simply shift its 
policy preferences according to the policies of the administration. This weakens the theories 
that argue that the American public is manipulated easily by the policymakers. Furthermore, if 
the public changes toward being in favor of more cooperative policies toward China, then this 
change tends to be followed by a change toward more conflictual policies. This is not 
necessarily surprising, as the public debate may fluctuate. A more peculiar finding is that the 
American public opinion is granger-caused by Chinese foreign policy toward the US, but the 
lags do not become significant until three months after the change in Chinese policy, and the 
coefficient sign is negative. This means that a change toward more conflictual policies by the 
Chinese government leads to a change toward arguing for less conflictual policies three 
months after the Chinese changed their policies. Such a relationship is not easily interpretable. 
However, keeping the fluctuating nature of the public debate in mind, it is possible that it does 
take time before public opinion is affected by the Chinese behavior. Furthermore, before the 
three months have passed, it is possible that public debates rage about how Chinese policies 
should be interpreted and met and that it simply takes time before the public at large shifts: 
While we might intuitively believe that the American public should want to meet conflictual 
policies with conflictual policies, and cooperative policies with cooperative policies, it is 
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possible that the general public tends to believe that a change toward more conflictual policies 
by the Chinese means that the US administration should follow less conflictual policies and 
accommodate the Chinese. Accordingly, the public may believe that a Chinese change toward 
more cooperative policies means that the US can and should put greater pressure on the 
Chinese to accommodate American interests and demands. Another possibility, which will be 
tested below, is that changes in Chinese policies have an instantaneous and positive impact on 
the public. It is possible that a shift toward more conflictual policies by the Chinese are met 
with a change toward arguing for more conflictual policies toward China by the American 
public during the same month. As the reduced VAR model does not allow us to estimate the 
impact of the contemporaneous values of the independent variables on the dependent 
variables, but only the impact of lagged values, it is possible that the true relationship is 
masked by the model. 
 As argued in Chapter Two and Three, the thesis should test whether the relationship 
between the US and China is best understood in terms of rational expectations. Such a 
relationship can be investigated by analyzing the residuals (uUSA, uCHINA and uPUBOP). 
According to table 12, there is little support for this hypothesis. While there is significant 
correlation between the error terms for the equations for American and Chinese foreign policy, 
the correlation is quite weak at 0,2793. At the same time, it may be noted that there is no 
correlation between public opinion and US China policy. Such a correlation could be 
interpreted in the same way, with US policymakers responding to American public opinion 
changing more/less than expected. 
Table 12: Residual Correlation 
 uUSA uCHINA uPUBOP 
uUSA 1   
uCHINA 0,2790*** 1  
uPUBOP -0,0342 0,0596 1 
* p<0,05, ** p<0,01, ***p<0,001 
Finally, it may be noted that when studying the control variables, there was not found 
any evidence to suggest that American China-policies has varied over the US Presidents H.W. 
Bush, Clinton, or Bush jr. However, the EP-3 incident was found to have had a significant 
impact on changes in US China policy, while the other two incidents did not have a 
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significant impact. For Chinese policies towards the US, both the EP-3-incident, as well as the 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Beograd, were found to have a conflictual impact on 
Chinese policies. None of the control variables were found to be significant for changes in 
public opinion. 
Table 13: Control Variables 
 dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp 
ep3 8,497521* 9,41712* 0,0077769 
embassy 2,724121 3,659744* 0,0082133 
alq -2,77468 -3,126932 0,0089465 
bush -0,1911134 0 -0,0001211 
clinton -0,2598176 0 0,0005883 
Constant 0,2035537 -0,0500813 -0,0005164 
* p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001 
  
4.2 Model 2: Structural Vector Autoregression 
Table 14 shows the results of the SVAR model for the contemporaneous effects on the 
variables. The horizontal variables represent the impulse variables (the shocks), while the 
vertical variables represents the response variables, the magnitude of the shock corresponding 
to one unit standard deviation. For example, a shock to changes in Chinese policies causes no 
significant changes in American public opinion, but causes the contemporaneous value of 
dAmPol to increase by about 43,8% of it’s standard deviation, indicating that American 
policymakers reciprocate unexpected changes in Chinese policies. 
Table 14: Results of Cholesky decomposition, Main Model 
 dChiPol dPubOp dAmPol 
dChiPol 
[
          0 0
0 000   0 0 00       0
0           0 0   0      0 0   
] dPubOp 
dAmPol 
* indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 95% 
significance level. 
While identifying the SVAR-model produces essentially the same results as the VAR-
model above, it is useful to use impulse response functions as these can describe how a shock 
to the system has an impact on the variables over time. Figure 7 illustrates how changes in 
American policies toward China are affected by changes in American public opinion. The 
blue lines represent the impulse response function while the shaded bands represent the 95% 
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confidence interval. The impulse response function let us investigate how the values of the 
variables change when we shock one of the variables by increasing the value of the error term 
by the standard value, and track the impact for one year (12 lags). As noted in the previous 
chapter, the shocks can be seen as representing unexpected changes in policies or, in the case 
of public opinion, unexpected changes in public opinion. Accordingly, significant changes 
following a shock may be seen as supporting theories arguing that rational expectations, or 
perceptions, are important for understanding Sino-American relations. All the impulse 
response functions were calculated for one year (12 months) following the initial shock. 
ThweY-axis shows the changes in terms of percent of the standard deviation. Accordingly, 
Figure 8 shows that a shock to changes in Chinese policies toward the equal to a standard 
deviation may be interpreted as causing a change in changes in American China policy equal 
to 43,8 percent of its standard deviation. 
Figure 7:How a shock to changes in American China policy impacts on changes in 
American China policy 
 
In essence, the figures illustrate the relationships described under 4.1. First, figure 1 
demonstrates how a shock to American China policy has an impact on subsequent policies. 
An unexpected change toward more conflictual policies at t=0, causes a change in the 
opposite direction the next month, even if this change is smaller than the initial change. While 
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there are subsequent fluctuations, none of these is significantly different from zero. This, then, 
deviates from the findings under 4.1 and demonstrates the need to be careful when 
interpreting the coefficients of reduced VAR analyses. Other than this, the results above can 
be interpreted as in 4.1, where American policymakers are concerned with keeping the Sino-
American relationship stable. Having changed their policies to be more conflictual 
(cooperative) during one month, policymakers change their policies to become less conflictual 
(cooperative) during the following month, almost, but not quite, neutralizing the impact of the 
first change.  
Figure 8: How a shock to changes in Chinese policies towards the US impacts on 
changes in American China policy 
 
Figure 8 illustrates how the US responds to changes in Chinese foreign policy. As the 
model allows changes in Chinese foreign policymaking to have an immediate impact on 
changes in US policies towards China, it is tested whether such an impact is significant. We 
see that there is indeed such a contemporaneous impact: If there is a change towards more 
conflictual policies by the Chinese during one month, US policymakers respond immediately 
and reciprocate the Chinese change by pursuing more conflictual policies during the same 
month, thus explaining the somewhat surprising results under 4.1, where there was found a 
two-month lag before changes in Chinese policies had any impact on changes in American 
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policies. As the lags for the first and second month are not significantly different from zero, 
this can be interpreted as American policymakers not changing their policies during these 
months and upholding the pressure. During the third month, however, there is a change in US 
policies in the opposite direction of the initial change, indicating a change towards the policy 
the US would have pursued, had there not been an unexpected change in Chinese policies. 
During the following five months, there are no significant changes in US policies towards 
China. During the ninth month, however, there is a small, but significant change in the 
opposite direction of the initial shock. The finding that the US reciprocates Chinese policies is 
hardly surprising according to a tit-for-tat logic. Furthermore, that US policymakers wait three 
months before normalizing the relationship is hardly surprising either, as the memory of the 
Chinese actions are remembered and seen as relevant to the policymaking progress. It may be 
more problematic to explain why there is another change after nine months: While this thesis 
will not attempt to explain why there is a nine-month lag, this change may be seen as 
American policymakers finally normalizing the US China policy, as, according to figure 7, 
the changes made in the third month do not seem sufficient enough to normalize the policies. 
Figure 9: How a shock to changes in American public opinion impacts on changes in 
American China policy 
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  Figure 9 illustrates how American China policy changes following a shock to changes 
in American public opinion. According to the figure, a change where the public seems to 
support more cooperative (conflictual) policies leads to a change toward more cooperative 
(conflictual) policies during the next month. After this initial reaction, there are no significant 
changes to US foreign policy. This should be interpreted as meaning that unless the public 
seems to shift at a later point in time, US foreign policy will continue to be influenced by this 
first shift. It should also be noted that while the statistical model allows public opinion to have 
a contemporaneous influence on US foreign policy, the results do not support such a 
contemporaneous impact. This finding may be used to argue that American policymakers do 
not allow sudden shifts in public opinion to affect their policies. Rather, it may be that it takes 
a month before they are able to perceive the shift, or that they consciously wait for a month 
before accommodating the wishes of the public . 
 Apart from analyzing how the different variables have an impact on US China policy, 
we should also evaluate how the variables have an impact on American public opinion in 
order to be able to assess whether policymakers may manipulate public opinion in this way. 
Figure 10: How a shock to changse in American China policy impacts on changes in 
American public opinion. 
First, figure 10 shows that there is no direct impact of changes in American China policy on 
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changes in American public opinion: None of the changes is significantly different from zero. 
However, the statistical model does not allow policies by the US toward China to affect 
public opinion contemporaneously. This means that there is a possibility that American 
policies may affect the public, but if it does, there are no long-term impacts, whereas Figure 3 
found clear indications of an impact of public opinion on foreign policy. 
 
Figure 11: How a shock to changes in Chinese policies towards the US impacts on 
changse in American public opinion 
Figure 11 illustrates how an unexpected shock to Chinese foreign policy toward the US 
affects the American public. The figure shows the same peculiar relationship between the 
variables as was found by examining the signs of the coefficients of the reduced VAR model 
in 4.1. The impact is weak, yet significant. While there is a slight change toward supporting 
policies that are more conflictual during the same month if Chinese policies change to become 
more conflictual, this contemporary impact is not significantly different from zero. After three 
months, however, the public changes to support more cooperative policies, followed by four 
months where the initial Chinese policy change has no direct impact. During the eighth month, 
however, there is another change toward more cooperative policies (given that the initial 
Chinese change was toward more conflictual policies). As the structural VAR model allows 
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for the contemporaneous impact of Chinese policies on the public, it is interesting to note that 
the results do not support such assumptions. This, then, leaves out the possible explanation 
under 4.1, that Chinese policies have an immediate positive impact on the American public, 
with subsequent changes simply indicating a change back toward the policies the public 
would support if the initial Chinese change did not takes place. Because of this, we are left 
with the interpretation that there is a negative relationship between the variables, with changes 
toward conflictual (cooperative) policies being met with support for cooperative (conflictual) 
policies. If we compare figure 2 with figure 5 we can note the similarities. During the third 
month, both American policies and American public opinion changes toward a more 
cooperative approach (given that the initial change by the Chinese was conflictual), and there 
is a similar shift during the eight and the ninth month respectively.  
Figure 12: How a shock to changes in American China policy impacts on changes 
toward the US 
  
Finally, Figure 12 and 13 illustrate how shocks to US policies and Chinese policies 
respectively affect changes in Chinese policy toward the US. First, and as noted for the US, 
changes to Chinese policies tend to be followed by smaller changes in the opposite direction. 
Shifts toward more conflictual policies toward the US are followed by changes toward more 
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cooperative policies, but not sufficient enough to equal the initial change. Furthermore, during 
the first month following shocks to US China policy, Chinese policies change toward more 
conflictual (cooperative) if the American policies changed toward more conflictual 
(cooperative), and more cooperative (conflictual) during the subsequent month.  
Figure 13: How a shock to changes in Chinese policy toward the US impacts on 
changes in Chinese policy toward the US 
However, we should also investigate which shocks are predominant in accounting for 
the variability in the results. This can be done by forecast error variance decomposition 
(FEVD). According to figure 14, the impacts of lagged changes in American China policy 
account for far more of the variance than do both changes in public opinion and changes in 
Chinese policies toward the US, close to 90%. At the same time, shocks to changes in public 
opinion account for close to 0% during the first month after the shock, but increase to account 
for approximately 10% of the variance during subsequent months. Shocks to the error term in 
changes to Chinese policies account for about 8% during the first month after the shock, a 
number that decreases to about 5% during the second and third month, before it finally 
increases to over 12% as the number of lags increase. As noted in Chapter Two, the impact of 
lagged changes in American China policy can be attributed to so-called self-driven behavior, 
accounting for both bureaucratic behavior and all internal impacts except American public 
opinion for which we have a separate variable. This implies that in order to understand US 
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China policy, we should pay more attention to internal characteristics of the US than to 
Chinese behavior, an argument that may lead us to believe that theories emphasizing internal 
aspects of the US (i.e. Primat der Innenpolitik-theories, neoclassical realism, etcetera) are 
more appropriate than theories emphasizing the behavior of other states (Primat der 
Aussenpolitik – theories such as some variants of Realism). However, it should be noted that 
the data do not really allow us to make such inferences. Conceivably, some Realists might 
argue that the data do not distinguish between issues that matter (“High politics”) and issues 
that do not matter (“Low politics”). While this argument is not invalid, this is a question of 
definition, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Figure 14: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, dAmPol 
 
4.3 Summary of Main Findings 
The analysis of the results of the reduced VAR and SVAR models has provided important 
insights into the mechanisms discussed in the theoretical chapter. While most of the results 
conformed to the expectations formulated in the hypotheses, some of the results were less 
easily interpretable, and some partially contradicted the expectations. 
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The reduced VAR-model, with subsequent Granger causation Wald test, confirmed the 
hypotheses H1a, H2a and H3a, i.e. supporting the hypotheses that public opinion and Chinese 
policies do have an impactimpact on American China policy, as well as the hypothesis that 
American public opinion changes according to Chinese foreign policy. Hypothesis H4a was 
not confirmed, however, indicating that American public opinion is not influenced by 
preceding American China policy. Furthermore, when analyzing the residuals of the three 
equations from which the model is constructed, the correlation between the residuals was seen 
as too weak to support hypothesis H2c, indicating that Sino-American should not be 
interpreted in terms of rational expectations. 
The SVAR-model produced the same results as the VAR-model, and allowed further insights 
into the relationship between the variables. First, it was apparent that the changes in the 
foreign policies of both the US and China were influenced by unexpected changes in the 
policies of the other, thus providing support for H2c. Hypothesis H1b was confirmed by 
analyzing the results of impulse-response functions. The analysis indicated that American 
foreign policy tends to change toward the policies preferred by the public one month after a 
shift in public opinion, and that the policies would remain at this level under ceteris paribus 
conditions. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that American policies toward China 
reciprocate changes in Chinese policies, but that these changes are reversed over time, thus 
confirming hypothesis H2b. Somewhat surprisingly, the American public was not found to 
reciprocate changes in Chinese policies. Rather, it was found to change toward less conflictual 
policies if the Chinese policies changed toward more conflictual policies, and vice versa, thus 
disconfirming hypothesis H3b. In this way, the public may force American policymakers to 
reverse initial reciprocation, by forcing them to return to the level of 
confrontation/cooperation that would have been held had the Chinese not changed their 
policies. Furthermore, and as indicated by the Granger causation Wald test above, changes in 
American China-polices were not found to have any impact on changes in American public 
opinion. Finally, it was found that current changes in American foreign policy toward China 
are influenced by previous changes, thus disconfirming hypothesis H5. However, these 
changes were found to be negatively, and not positively, correlated with previous changes, 
meaning that changes toward more conflictual policies are followed by changes toward less 
conflictual policies, and vice versa. It was suggested that this might be due to policymakers 
attempting to keep the relationship stable. 
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Finally, although not included among the hypotheses, changes in Chinese policies were found 
to reciprocate changes in American policies and to be influenced by earlier changes in 
Chinese policies. Unsurprisingly, changes in Chinese policies were not found to be Granger-
caused by previous changes in American public opinion. 
Table 15:Stated Hypotheses 
Number Stated Hypothesis Support? 
H1a Changes in American public opinion Granger-cause changes in 
American foreign policy toward China. 
Yes 
H1b Changes in American public opinion toward a more conflictual 
(cooperative) approach increases the probability of a change 
toward more conflictual (cooperative) policies by the United 
States toward China.  
Yes 
H2a Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward the US Granger-
cause changes in American foreign policies toward China 
Yes 
H2b Changes in Chinese foreign policy toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward the United States increase the 
probability of a change toward more conflictual (cooperative) 
policies by the United States toward China. 
Yes 
H2c Changes in American foreign policies toward China are caused 
by changes in Chinese foreign policies toward China deviating 
from expectations.  
No (VAR) 
Yes    (SVAR) 
H3a Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward the United States 
Granger-cause changes in American public opinion. 
Yes 
H3b Changes in Chinese foreign policies toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward the United States increase the 
probability of American public opinion changing toward 
supporting a more conflictual (cooperative) approach. 
No 
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H4a Changes in American foreign policies toward China Granger-
cause changes in American public opinion. 
No 
H4b Changes in American foreign policies toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward China increase the probability of 
American public opinion changing toward supporting a more 
conflictual (cooperative) approach. 
No 
H5 Changes in American foreign policies toward more conflictual 
(cooperative) policies toward China do not increase the 
probability of subsequent changes in American foreign policy 
toward China. 
No 
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5.0 Post-Estimation Diagnostics 
When using vector autoregressive models in analyses, it is the norm to perform certain post-
estimation tests in order to make sure that the inferences found are not simply caused by 
arbitrary or theoretically irrelevant properties of the data, or faulty assumptions of the 
statistical model. In the following chapter I will perform these tests, testing the present of non-
stationarity and unit root, the normality of the residuals, the stability of the model, the number 
of lags used, and autocorrelation. In the final part of the chapter I will comment on the 
implications of these tests for statistical validity, as well as the implications for the theoretical 
framework of the analysis. 
 
5.1 Unit roots 
In vector autoregressive models, the variables are assumed to be stationary, stationary time-
series being “…characterized by a kind of statistical equilibrium around a constant mean level 
as well as a constant dispersion around that mean level” (Yaffee 2000:5-7). When time-series 
are stationary, autocorrelation diminishes quite rapidly, but when they are non-stationary, 
autocorrelation tends to persist. If two independent, non-stationary time-series are regressed 
on one another, the results may nonetheless imply that there is a causal relationship between 
the two. This spurious relationship is being caused entirely by the stochastic trends in the 
time-series. Accordingly, the variables used in this thesis have been tested for non-stationarity 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test as well as the Phillips-Perron unit root test, 
the null hypothesis being that the variable is non-stationary. The results are presented in the 
table below; the p-value being shown is the probability of the null hypothesis being true. 
According to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit roots test, then, the 
variables are stationary. 
Table 16 : Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (14 lags) Phillips-Perron test 
 1% 
Critical 
Value 
Z(t) MacKinnon 
approximate  
p-value for Z(t) 
1% 
Critical 
Value 
Z(t) MacKinnon 
approximate  
p-value for Z(t) 
dAmPol -3,489 -4,414 0,0003 -3,484 -29,391 0,0000 
dChiPol -3,489 -4,322 0,0004 -3,484 -27,922 0,0000 
dPubOp -3,489 -4,223 0,0006 -3,484 -28,023 0,0000 
 
77 
 
5.2 Normal Disturbances 
The significance tests of the VAR models used here assume that the errors are normally 
distributed. If they are not, we may erroneously come to base our conclusions on the 
significance test, which may cause us to make the wrong conclusions (Lütkepohl 2011:3-4).  
In Stata, this may be tested by using the command varnorm, which tests the disturbances 
against the null hypothesis that the disturbances are normally distributed by testing for 
whether for kurtosis, skewness and applying the Jarque-Bera test, which produces a statistic 
based on the degree of skewness and kurtosis. As shown in table 17, the tests do not reject the 
null hypothesis of normal disturbances, assuming 95% significance level. Accordingly, it can 
be assumed that the errors are normally distributed.  
Table 17: Jarque-Bera test, Skewness, and Kurtosis 
 Jarque-Bera 
test 
Probability > 
χ2 
Skewness 
Probability > 
χ2 
Kurtosis 
Probability > 
χ2 
dAmPol 0,197 0,276 0,151 
dChiPol 0,844 0,661 0,700 
dPubOp 0,797 0,963 0,501 
All 
equations 
0,671 0,710 0,447 
 
5.3 Covariance-Stationarity 
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According to Hamilton (1994:259-260), the process needs to be covariance-stationary, 
meaning, quite simply, that any consequences of εt must decrease over time. This can easily 
be tested in Stata, using the command varstable, which computes a set of eigenvalues from 
the vector autoregressive model of which none must be larger than “one”. The eigenvalues are 
printed in table 18 below, and illustrated in figure 15. As all of the eigenvalues fall within the 
unit circle (where the boundary of the circle equals an eigenvalue of “one”), none of the 
moduli are larger than one, indicating that the model is stable. 
Table 18: Eigenvalue Stability Condition 
Eigenvalue Modulus 
-0.2423134 0.7912839 0.827554    
-0.2423134 - 0.7912839 0.827554    
0.4139011 0.7123883 0.8239    
0.4139011 -  0.7123883 0.8239    
-0.6114993 0.5229496 0.804616    
-0.6114993 0.5229496 0.804616    
-0.797526 0.07131969 0.800709    
-0.797526 -0.07131969 0.800709    
0.102971 0.7723928 0.779226    
0.102971 -  0.7723928 0.779226    
-0.689173 0.2783391 0.743258 
-0.689173 -  0.2783391 0.743258    
0.493011 0.5455572 0.735318    
0.493011 -  0.5455572 0.735318    
-0.1021154 0.6992106 0.706628    
-0.1021154 -  0.6992106 0.706628    
0.2616353 0.3191455 0.412683    
0.2616353 -  0.3191455 0.412683    
  
5.4 The Number of Lags and Autocorrelation 
One of the most important aspects when specifying a VAR model, is determining the lag 
length of the model – choosing the wrong lag length is likely to have grave consequences for 
the stability of the findings, as the coefficient estimates of the model is likely to depend on the 
number of lagged values allowed to have an impact on the variables. When selecting a too 
high lag order, i.e. too many lags, the forecast error increases. When selecting too few lags, 
errors tend to be autocorrelated (Ozcicek and McMillin 1999:517-518).  
 The lag order for the models of Chapter Four was chosen by employing the Aikaike 
information criterion (AIC), which suggested that using a lag order of six would be 
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appropriate. Alternatively, the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC) or the Schwarz’ 
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) could have been used: Both criteria suggested three 
lags to be appropriate, but when applying the Lagrange multiplier test for autocorrelation the 
results indicated the presence of autocorrelation.
34
 When applying the Lagrange multiplier test 
for six lags, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be refused, indicating that there 
is no presence of autocorrelation (see Chapter Five). Table 19 below shows the results of the 
lag-order selection statistics, the number of lags suggested by the information criteria being 
marked with an asterisk. Table 20 shows the results of the Lagrange multiplier test for VAR 
models with three and six lags respectively:  
Table 19: Lag Length Suggested by Information Criterion 
Lags AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 1.97587    2.11399     2.3161   
1 1.23709    1.44427    1.74744   
2 .968963     1.2452    1.64942   
3 .697076    1.04238*   1.54765* 
4 693952    1.10831    1.71464   
5 .584668    1.06809    1.77547   
6 .578692*   1.13117    1.93961   
7 .652426    1.27397    2.18346   
8 .640493   1.33109    2.34164   
9 .697168   1.45683    2.56843   
10 .75882 1.58754     2.8002   
11 .770956    1.66874    2.98245   
12 .830975 1.79782    3.21258   
13 .857962    1.89386    3.40968   
14 .901624    2.00659    3.62346   
15 .892872    2.06689    3.78482   
* - The suggested number of lags 
                                                          
34
 For details on the Lagrange multiplier test, see Breusch and Pagan (1980). 
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Table 20: Lagrange-multiplier test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Robustness of Specifications 
 VAR models are often criticized because they have a tendency to not to be robust to different 
ways of specifying the models (Howard 2010:405). To test whether the results found in 
Chapter Four were primarily caused by how the model was specified, the Cholesky 
decomposition was repeated with new specifications: In the first, Chinese policies were not 
allowed to be contemporaneously influenced by any of the other variables; American policies 
were allowed to be contemporaneously influenced by Chinese policies, but not by public 
opinon; and American public opinion was allowed to be influenced by both American and 
Chinese policies. The results were found to be quite similar to those of the SVAR model in 
Chapter Four. 
Table 21: Cholesky decomposition matrix, Alternative model 1 
 dChiPol dAmPol dPubOp 
dChiPol 
[
          0 0
0             0      0
0 000   0  0 000     0 00       
] dAmPol 
dPubOp 
As may be seen, the matrix displaying the result of the Cholesky decomposition shows 
essentially the same values as the one in Chapter Four. Similarly, the impulse response 
functions show essentially the same values and same cause-effect-relationships. It may be 
noted that when the American foreign policy towards China was allowed to impact on public 
opinion contemporaneously, no significant relationship was found. The lack of impact found 
in the previous chapter was therefore not caused by the way the model was specified. 
 Χ
2 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Prob > Χ2 
VAR-model 3 lags    
Lag 1 11,4170 9 0,24821 
Lag 2 29,5281 9 0,00053 
VAR-model 6 lags    
Lag 1 5,1265 9 0,82315 
Lag 2 8,2834 9 0,50585 
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 A second model was constructed, in which American policies were allowed to impact 
on Chinese policies and public opinion contemporaneously, but not allowed to be influenced 
by the contemporaneous values of these. Chinese policies were allowed to have a 
contemporaneous impact on American public opinion, but not on American foreign policies. 
Finally, American public opinion was contemporaneously influenced by both Chinese and 
American foreign policies. The matrix clearly shows that one of the assumptions of the 
previous chapter is uncertain: there is a significant and positive contemporaneous effect of 
American policies on Chinese policies. Accordingly, it is emphasized that this thesis does not 
claim that Chinese policies have a contemporaneous effect on American policies while the 
opposite is not true: rather, it is assumed that the policies of the two states affect each other, at 
least when aggregated at a monthly level.
35
 More important for this thesis is that neither 
Chinese policies nor American are found to have a contemporaneous effect on the American 
public opinion.
36
 
Table 22: Cholesky decomposition matrix, Alternative model 2 
 dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp 
dAmPol 
[
      00  0 0
0                   0
 0 000     0 000     0 00       
] dChiPol 
dPubOp 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Having performed the recommended diagnostic tests for the vector autoregressive and having 
tested whether the results of the Cholesky decomposition changed when the assumptions of 
the contemporaneous relationship between the variables was changed, some statements may 
be made about the validity of the statistical conclusions of this thesis. The tests performed 
here imply that the statistical models used in this thesis have been specified correctly. 
Furthermore, there was not found any indication of a stochastic trend in the data, which may, 
if present, have led to spurious relationships. Accordingly, and if accepting the claim of 
                                                          
35
 As noted in Chapter Three, as well as in the next chapter, it is pointed out that data aggregated at a weekly 
level might be more appropriate, as monthly levels may mask some of the effects and make it seem like there is a 
contemporaneous relationship. 
36
 The reader might, of course, ask why only three specifications of the SVAR model have been tested when 
there are 9 possible specifications (as long as short-term constraints are used). The answer is simply that the rest 
of the models would have to assume that it was possible for the American public to influence Chinese politics 
towards the US contemporaneously – a possibility not advocated by neither theory, nor by intuition. 
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Chapter Three - that the measures used in the analysis are reliable - it can be assumed that the 
results are statistically valid (Lund 2002:105-106). However, there is, as noted, one caveat: It 
is not, based on the results of the SVAR-analysis in Chapter Four, possible to claim that 
changes in Chinese policies are not affected by changes in American policies during the same 
month. The lack of such an effect was caused by the specification of the SVAR model, and 
the results above do, indeed, imply that changes in American policies towards China cause 
Chinese changes during the same month. What is more important for this thesis, however, is 
that the other results remained stable even when the specification was changed. A few 
comments may, then, be made concerning the choice of theoretical framework for this thesis: 
neoclassical realism. 
 The results and analysis of Chapter Four did provide support for the hypotheses 
associated with neoclassical realism. However, it should be pointed out that the purpose of 
this thesis has not been to test the theory of neoclassical realism in itself. Rather, the purpose 
has been to test the assumption of whether American public opinion has an impact on 
American foreign policy towards China, and, additionally, whether American policies are 
influenced by Chinese policies and previous American policies. Accordingly, all theories 
allowing for these variables to have an impact may be seen as supported. Neoclassical realism 
was chosen as a framework both because it includes all variables used in the analysis in its 
theoretical framework, and also because it explicitly notes the significance of perceptions and 
shocks, which are central to SVAR models. However, while the assumptions of neoclassical 
realism concerning which variables have an impact on US foreign policies towards China are 
tested, the purported mechanisms of neoclassical realism are not tested. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
The bilateral relationship between the US and China is of crucial importance to maintaining 
the future stability of East Asian relations. If China can find solutions to the political, social 
and economic problems it faces, it might even become a global player, on par with the United 
States. If this should be the case, understanding what factors have an effect on this 
relationship is of paramount importance. Part of the equation is understanding Chinese 
policies and the intentions of the Chinese leadership, in order to predict whether the China of 
tomorrow is likely to pursue expansionist or cooperative policies. The other part of the 
equation, the policies of the US,  is equally important as it is by no means certain how the US 
might react to a perceived challenger to its “Unipolar moment“(Krauthammer 1990). 
 This thesis has looked at the latter part of the equation, noting that much of scholarly 
work on Sino-American relations is based on the assumption that American public opinion 
either is or is not of significant importance to understanding US policies toward China. To the 
point, this thesis has set out to test this assumption by posing the research question: 
Does American public opinion have an impact on American foreign policy toward China? 
After introducing the problem in Chapter One, Chapter Two set out by presenting the 
development of the debate on whether the American public opinion has had an impact on 
American foreign policies in general. Following this, the chapter argued that the theory of 
neoclassical realism should be applied as a framework within which we could more easily 
understand this relationship, as well as make assumptions about how the public may have an 
impact. After arguing that the public is likely to have an impact, because policymakers are 
worried about support from the public, it was argued that the state leader’s perception of what 
the public believes and thinks is more important than what the public actually believes and 
thinks. It was then pointed out that while public opinion is likely to influence the decisions of 
policymakers, the decisions of policymakers also are likely to influence the public. In other 
words, theory argues that it is likely that the relationship between the two is endogenic, and it 
would accordingly be wrong simply to assume that the public has an impact on foreign policy, 
but not vice versa. 
 In the first part of Chapter Three it was pointed out that doing research on public 
opinion and foreign policy is problematic, partly because the information we seek is not 
available to the public, partly because we cannot trust the information we have, and partly 
because of the problem of endogeneity. In the second part of the chapter, I argued that event 
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data can be used as a way to “measure” the foreign policy of one state toward another state 
over time, and presented the dataset “10 Million International Dyadic Events” (Will and Lowe 
2003a) used in the thesis. Because there are no comprehensive polling data for public opinion 
toward China over time, and because it was argued in Chapter Two that perception of public 
opinion, most often informed by mass media accounts, is more relevant than actual public 
opinion, it was argued that a quantitative content analysis was necessary. After describing in 
detail how the data were gathered and what assumptions were made in order to infer how the 
policymakers should perceive the public during any given month, I used the Yoshikoder text 
analysis software and the list of negative words from the General Inquirer dictionary in order 
to obtain a measure of the perceived public opinion. After having described how the different 
variables were constructed, I introduced and identified the VAR and the SVAR model used in 
the thesis. The VAR model, although it has been criticized for being atheoretical, was seen as 
appropriate for the research question, as it is able to handle endogenic relationships and does 
not need the user to make assumptions about the relationship between the variables when such 
assumptions are not made by the theories used. The SVAR model, however, allows the user to 
introduce some of the assumptions of the theories into the equation, thereby allowing him/her 
to model how the variables have an impact on each other over time, as well as allowing 
him/her to test the theory. Furthermore, the SVAR model allows the user to model how 
perceptions and shocks affect policies. In the final part of the chapter, I presented a table with 
an updated version of the hypotheses made in Chapter Two. 
 In Chapter Four, the results of the VAR and SVAR models were presented. After 
running a Granger causation Wald test, it was found that public opinion did seem to have a 
significant impact on American foreign policymaking. Furthermore, it was found that 
American China policy also seems to be influenced by both Chinese policies toward the US, 
as well as by earlier American policies toward China (indicating the presence of bureaucratic 
routine). When the SVAR model was run the relationship between the variables were 
illustrated by using impulse-response functions. First, it was found that American policies 
seem to reciprocate Chinese policies immediately, and even though the American policies 
during the subsequent months seem to be interpretable as a change back toward “normal” 
policies, the effect of the reciprocation seems to linger. The results for the effect of 
“bureaucratic routine” were similar: If American policies toward China should change toward 
becoming more conflictual during one month, then the subsequent month would involve a 
change back toward “normal” levels, but this latter change would not be large enough to equal 
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the initial change. More importantly – in light of this thesis - is that when American public 
opinion became more conflictual toward China, American policies would change and become 
more conflictual during the subsequent month and remain on this level, ceteris paribus. It 
should also be noted that if the Chinese were to pursue more cooperative policies toward the 
US, American public opinion would eventually react by becoming more conflictual, perhaps 
indicating that the American public might interpret Chinese cooperation as a sign of weakness 
and Chinese confrontation as a sign of strength. As it stands, the results imply that the public 
can act both as a barrier to the preferred policies of the state leaders, but also as an 
independent force driving American polices. For the latter, shocks to public opinion during 
one month are followed by shifts in foreign policies the subsequent month in accordance with 
the assumed wishes of the public. For the former, shocks to changes in Chinese policies 
during one month seem to cause immediate reciprocation in American policies. However, in 
the following months, the public gradually shifts and ends up advocating a change 
counteracting the immediate American reciprocation, leading to a shift in American polies. 
On a final note, it was found, by forecast error variance decomposition, that although Chinese 
policies and the American public do have an impact on US China-policies, other internal 
factors have a far greater impact on American policies. 
 
It should be noted, first, that the data used in this thesis cover the period from 1990 to 2004. It 
is possible that the relationships between the variables are changing as China may have 
become relatively more powerful following the financial crisis.
37
 As noted in Chapter Two, 
the public is less likely to be able to influence foreign policy if the state leaders perceive other 
states as possible threats. Second, it would have been preferable to be able to compare the 
variable for public opinion with polling data for the period, as it might have indicated whether 
this variable seemed valid or not. Thirdly, as was noted in the introduction, the variable used 
for foreign policies does not cover all aspects of the concept of foreign policy, and event data 
are not without problems. Because of the first and the third of these issues, the external 
validity of the thesis may be threatened, and, accordingly, generalizations from the data to 
other political issues, other states or over time may not be warranted (Lund 2002:121). 
                                                          
37
 Either an actual shift in power or a perceived shift. 
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 This, however, also indicates possible venues of future research. The construction of 
new event data sets is no longer a daunting task, as long as one has access to the databases, as 
well as the appropriate software. Furthermore, it seems as if policymakers are once again 
considering the potential of event data, as the American Defense Advance Research Project 
Agency (also known as DARPA) has initiated what they called the Integrated Crisis Early 
Warning System (ICEWS), which essentially is gathering real-time event data in order to 
make forecasts about world developments (ICEWS URL). Moreover, while it is too much too 
hope for an ongoing survey asking policymakers about what they believe the public would 
like them to do, more research should be directed toward studying how policymakers gather 
information about public opinion. 
 Another, possible venue of research is that on public opinion itself. While it was 
expected that the American public would respond to conflictual policies by the Chinese with a 
demand for reciprocation, this was not supported by data. In fact, it was found that more 
conflictual policies by the Chinese were met with a demand for less conflictual policies by the 
US. This surprising result indicates that more effort should go into studying how the public 
reacts to the behavior of other states. Furthermore, as it was found that changes in American 
policies toward China did not Granger-cause changes in American public opinion, efforts 
should be made to study how political messages spread through the media. As Randall L. 
Schweller pointed out in Chapter Two, politicians and others attempting to manipulate the 
public face a problem in the new “million-channel media universe” – people can increasingly 
seek out news based on whether they are in accordance with their political views. Such a 
study could possibly be informed by the contribution of Fan (1988) and his study of how 
ideas in the form of “memes” spread among the public by way of the mass media. First, how 
do policymakers perceive this allegedly new situation? Second, does the American public 
actually rely on such diverse media sources as talk radio and blogs for information about 
foreign policy issues such as the Sino-American relationship? Third, how do policymakers 
and politicians eager to influence the public opinion adjust to the new situation? Such 
questions are important for theories on the relationship between the public and policies, 
because it is conceivable that the public is more manipulable than assumed in this thesis, 
responding not to the policies of the policymakers, but to “information campaigns” initiated 
prior to the policy shifts. 
 As pointed out at the outset of the thesis, research on the future of Sino-American 
relations often rely on the assumption that the public does, or does not, have an impact on 
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American foreign policy, and thus on the Sino-American relationship. The thesis has shown 
that there is reason to believe that there is such a positive relationship. However, at the same 
time, it has been shown that it is not the only factor of importance. Future research needs to 
recognize such findings and acknowledge that research cannot be based on one factor alone, 
but needs to study how the factors impact on each other. 
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Appendix 
Additional Results 
 
Table 23: Additional results, VAR-model 
 No. of 
observations 
173  
    
 Equations 
 dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp 
dAmPol    
Lag 1 -
0,8024436*** 
0,2075941* 0,0002824 
Lag 2 -
0,6852279*** 
0,0651061 0,0002045 
Lag 3 -
0,5866403*** 
0,2401654* 0,0003115 
Lag 4 -0,3266036** 0,1768396 0,0005576 
Lag 5 -
0,3594345*** 
0,069779 0,0003336 
Lag 6 
 
dChiPol 
-0,1074693 0,1314541 -0,0000782 
Lag 1 0,0768861 -0,7872391*** -0,0001547 
Lag 2 0,242325* -0,6434635*** -0,0001453 
Lag 3 0,1161465 -0,6429286*** 0,0007963** 
Lag 4 0,2270369* -0,4402812*** -
0,0011847*** 
Lag 5 0,2492935** -0,2175912* -0,001104*** 
Lag 6 0,0046451 -0,0756451 -0,0006816** 
    
dPubOp    
Lag 1 103,0573*** 74,40125** -
0,7512557*** 
Lag 2 90,90323** 25,00953 -
0,5459208*** 
Lag 3 37,34891 50,12607 -
0,4092868*** 
Lag 4 2,136125 20,56018 -0,0984073 
Lag 5 -19,83249 -7,744684 -0,0560551 
Lag 6 20,51608 3,026123 -0,1046161 
    
ep3 8,497521* 9,41712* 0,0077769 
embassy 2,724121 3,659744* 0,0082133 
alq -2,77468 -3,126932 0,0089465 
bush -0,1911134 0 -0,0001211 
clinton -0,2598176 0 0,0005883 
Constant 0,2035537 -0,0500813 -0,0005164 
* p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001 
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Table 24:Additional results, SVAR-model 
 No. of observations 173  
    
 Equations 
 dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp 
dAmPol    
Lag 1 -0,8024436*** 0,2075941* 0,0002824 
Lag 2 -0,6852279*** 0,0651061 0,0002045 
Lag 3 -0,5866403*** 0,2401654* 0,0003115 
Lag 4 -0,3266036** 0,1768396 0,0005576 
Lag 5 -0,3594345*** 0,069779 0,0003336 
Lag 6 
 
dChiPol 
-0,1074693 0,1314541 -0,0000782 
Lag 1 0,0768861 -0,7872391*** -0,0001547 
Lag 2 0,242325* -0,6434635*** -0,0001453 
Lag 3 0,1161465 -0,6429286*** 0,0007963** 
Lag 4 0,2270369* -0,4402812*** -0,0011847*** 
Lag 5 0,2492935** -0,2175912* -0,001104*** 
Lag 6 0,0046451 -0,0756451 -0,0006816** 
    
dPubOp    
Lag 1 103,0573*** 74,40125** -0,7512557*** 
Lag 2 90,90323** 25,00953 -0,5459208*** 
Lag 3 37,34891 50,12607 -0,4092868*** 
Lag 4 2,136125 20,56018 -0,0984073 
Lag 5 -19,83249 -7,744684 -0,0560551 
Lag 6 20,51608 3,026123 -0,1046161 
    
ep3 8,497521* 9,41712* 0,0077769 
embassy 2,724121 3,659744* 0,0082133 
alq -2,77468  -3,126932 0,0089465 
bush -0,1911134  0 -0,0001211 
clinton -0,2598176 0 0,0005883 
Constant 0,2035537 -0,0500813 -0,0005164 
* p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001 
  
Short-run 
coefficients 
dChiPol dPubOp dAmPol 
dChiPol 1   
dPubOp -0,0001559       
 (-0,76) 
1  
dAmPol -0,2564304***  
(-3,87) 
16,31284      
(0,67) 
1 
* p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001; Z-statistic in parentheses 
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Table 25: Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, Chinese shocks, Main model 
 Shocks to Chinese policies (Impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the border of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the border of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the border of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 26:Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, Public Opinion shocks, Main model 
 Shocks to public opinon (impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 27: Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, American policy shocks, Main model 
 Shocks to American policies (impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 28: Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, Chinese shocks, Alternative Model 1 
 Shocks to Chinese policies (Impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 29:Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, Public Opinion shocks, Alternative Model 1 
 Shocks to public opinon (impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 30: Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, American policy shocks, Alternative Model 1 
 Shocks to American policies (impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 31: Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, Chinese shocks, Alternative Model 2 
 Shocks to Chinese policies (Impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 32:Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, Public Opinion shocks, Alternative Model 2 
 Shocks to public opinon (impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
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Table 33:Orthogonal Impulse Response Function, American policy shocks, Alternative Model 2 
 Shocks to American policies (impulse) 
Response in Chinese policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American Public Opinon 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
Response in American policies 
(Lower/Upper are the borders of 95% 
confidence interval) 
 
 
Search phrase used for Westlaw database 
TI(CHINA CHINE! BEIJING) & ((HLD(US U.S. USA "UNITED STATES" AMERICA! 
BUSH EAGLEBURGER BAKER QUAYLE CHENEY POWELL CLINTON GORE 
ALBRIGHT "WARREN CHRISTOPHER") & ((DEFENSE MILITARY "TAIWAN 
STRAIT" "SOUTH CHINA SEA" ARMY NAVY "AIR FORCE" (MISSILE! % (MISSILE! 
/S SALE! ROGUE IRAN PAKISTAN "NORTH KOREA")) "SECURITY INTEREST" 
"RISE OF CHINA") (FINANC! TRADE ECONOM** FAKE COUNTERFEIT 
((CURRENCY YUAN) /S (UNDERVALU! MANIPUL!)) OIL BUBBLE RECESSION 
SPY!))) ((CHINA BEIJING) & ("HUMAN RIGHTS" ARREST*** DEMOCRA! "CHILD 
LABOR" TIANANMEN REPRESS! OPPRESS! SUPPRESS! (TIBET! % PLATEAU)))) & 
(OI(EDITORIAL OP-ED) & DA(AFT 31/12/1989 & BEF 1/1/2005)) %LETTERS 
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 Syntax (Stata v.11), part 1 – Constructing the datafile 
All datasets and dictionaries used in this thesis will be provided upon request. 
(Contact: audun.reiby@gmail.com) 
 
 
 
cd M:\Master\Datasett 
 
clear 
clear matrix 
set mem 350m 
set matsize 800 
set more off, perm 
capture log using "Master.smcl",replace 
sysdir set PERSONAL M:\privat\Stata\ado\g\ado1 
 
use M:\Master\Datasett\1990-1995CountryDyads.dta , clear 
append using 1995-1999CountryDyads.dta 
append using 2000-2004CountryDyads.dta 
 
save 1990-2004CountryDyads.dta, replace 
 
*Descriptives 
describe 
summarize 
 
*Removes all irrelevant dyads 
keep if ((SRCNAME=="USA" & TGTNAME=="CHN") | (SRCNAME=="CHN" & 
TGTNAME=="USA")) 
 
*Dummy for SRCNAME 
gen sUSA = 0 
replace sUSA = 1 if SRCNAME=="USA" 
 
generate DATE = ym(YEAR, MONTH) 
 
keep DATE sUSA GNCUM 
 
reshape wide GNCUM, i(DATE) j(sUSA) 
 
rename GNCUM1 negUSAvCHINA 
rename GNCUM0 negCHINAvUSA 
 
*TSSET 
107 
 
tsset DATE, format (%tm) 
 
*Inserts data from content analysis, variable name "gi" 
 
save events_US_CH.dta, replace 
Syntax (Stata v.11), part 2 - Analysis 
cd M:\Master\Datasett 
 
clear 
clear matrix 
set mem 350m 
set matsize 800 
set more off, perm 
capture log using "Master.smcl",replace 
sysdir set PERSONAL M:\privat\Stata\ado\g\ado1 
 
use M:\Master\Datasett\events_US_CH.dta , clear 
 
 
*Generates dummies 
gen ep3=1 if DATE==m(2001m4) 
replace ep3=0 if ep3==. 
gen embassy=1 if DATE==m(1999m5) 
replace embassy=0 if embassy==. 
gen alq=1 if DATE==m(2001m9) 
replace alq=0 if alq==. 
gen hwbush=1 if (DATE>=m(1990m1) & DATE<m(1992m2)) 
replace hwbush=0 if hwbush==. 
gen clinton=1 if (DATE>=m(1992m2) & DATE<m(2000m2)) 
replace clinton=0 if clinton==. 
gen bush=1 if (DATE>=m(2000m2)) 
replace bush=0 if bush==. 
 
*Generates endogenous variables 
*dAmPol 
gen AmPol=sqrt(negUSAvCHINA) 
gen dAmPol=AmPol-AmPol[_n-1] 
 
graph twoway tsline AmPol, title("American China policy over time") /// 
tlabel(1990m1 1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1) 
graph twoway tsline dAmPol, title("Changes in American China policy over time") /// 
tlabel(1990m1 1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1) 
 
*dChiPol 
gen ChiPol=sqrt(negCHINAvUSA) 
gen dChiPol=ChiPol-ChiPol[_n-1] 
 
graph twoway tsline ChiPol, title("Chinese policies towards the US over time") /// 
108 
 
tlabel(1990m1 1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1) ylabel(0 2 4 6 8 
10 12) 
graph twoway tsline dChiPol, title("Changes in Chinese policies towards the US over time") 
/// 
tlabel(1990m1 1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1) 
 
*dPubOp 
gen PubOp=gi 
replace PubOp = PubOp[_n-1] if PubOp == 0 
gen dPubOp=D.PubOp 
 
graph twoway tsline PubOp, title("Mean negative words per editorial per month over time") 
/// 
tlabel(1990m1 1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1) ylabel(0 0.01 
0.02 0.03 0.04) 
 
 
*Model 1, VAR 
constraint define 4 [dChiPol] bush 
constraint define 5 [dChiPol] clinton 
 
var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) constraints(4 5) lags(1/15) 
varsoc 
var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) constraints(4 5) lags(1/3) 
/*autocorrelated*/ 
varlmar 
var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) constraints(4 5) lags(1/6) 
/*not autocorrelated*/ 
varlmar 
varwle 
varstable 
vargranger 
 
var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) constraints(4 5) lags(1/6) 
predict uUSA, resid equation(dAmPol) 
predict uCHINA, resid equation(dChiPol) 
predict uPubOp, resid equation(dPubOp) 
pwcorr uUSA uCHINA uPubOp, sig 
 
*Model 2, SVAR 
****************** 
matrix A = (1,0,0\.,1,0\.,.,1) 
matrix B = (.,0,0\0,.,0\0,0,.) 
matrix lis A 
matrix lis B 
 
*Neoclassical realist assumptions 
irf set results4 
qui capture irf drop results4 
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svar dChiPol dPubOp dAmPol, aeq(A) beq(B) var lags(1/6) exog(clinton bush alq embassy 
ep3) varconstraints(4 5) 
irf create results4, step(12) 
 
*Impulse response functions 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dAmPol) response(dAmPol) /// 
title("How a shock to changes in American China policy ") /// 
ustep(12) xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in American China policy") 
 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dChiPol) response(dAmPol) /// 
title("How a shock to changes in Chinese Policies toward the US ") /// 
ustep(12)  xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in American China policy") 
 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dPubOp) response(dAmPol) /// 
title("How a shock to changes in American public opinion") /// 
ustep(12)  xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in American China policy") 
 
 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dAmPol) response(dPubOp) /// 
title("How a shock to changes in American China/policy") /// 
ustep(12) xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in American Public Opinion") 
 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dChiPol) response(dPubOp) /// 
title("How a shock to changes in Chinese foreign policies toward the US") /// 
ustep(12) xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in American Public Opinion") 
 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dAmPol) response(dChiPol) /// 
title("How a shock to changes American China policy ", span) /// 
ustep(12) xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in Chinese policies toward the 
US") 
 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dPubOp) response(dChiPol) /// 
title("How a shock to changes in American Public Opinion", span) /// 
ustep(12) xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in Chinese policy toward the US") 
 
irf graph oirf, impulse(dChiPol) response(dChiPol) /// 
title("How a shock to changes in Chinese Policy toward the US", span) /// 
ustep(12) xtitle("Time (Months)") sub("impacts on changes in Chinese policy toward the US") 
 
 
*FEVD 
irf ograph (results4 dAmPol dAmPol fevd, ustep(12)) /// 
(results4 dChiPol dAmPol fevd, ustep(12))    /// 
(results4 dPubOp dAmPol fevd, ustep(12)),   /// 
title("Variance in American China policy accounted for by variables", span) /// 
xtitle("Time (Months)")  
 
*Cholesky decomposition 
matrix sig_var=e(Sigma) 
matrix list sig_var 
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matrix chol_var=cholesky(sig_var) 
matrix list chol_var 
 
irf table oirf 
 
********************************************** 
*** Post-Estimation ************************** 
********************************************** 
*Unit root 
dfuller dAmPol, lags(14) 
dfuller dAmPol, lags(14) trend 
dfuller dAmPol, lags(14) noconstant 
dfuller dChiPol, lags(14) 
dfuller dChiPol, lags(14) trend 
dfuller dChiPol, lags(14) noconstant 
dfuller dPubOp, lags(14) 
dfuller dPubOp, lags(14) trend 
dfuller dPubOp, lags(14) noconstant 
 
pperron dAmPol, lags(14) 
pperron dChiPol 
pperron dPubOp 
 
*Stable model with other specifications? 
 
 
*varstable 
qui var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) constraints(4 5) 
lags(1/6) 
varstable 
varstable, graph 
 
**SVAR-modeller med nye spesifikasjoner 
*dChiPol -> dAmPol -> dPubOp 
irf set results5 
qui capture irf drop results5 
 
irf create results5, step(12) 
irf table oirf 
 
matrix sig_var5=e(Sigma) 
matrix list sig_var5 
matrix chol_var5=cholesky(sig_var5) 
matrix list chol_var5 
 
*dAmPol -> dChiPol -> dPubOp 
irf set results6 
qui capture irf drop results6 
qui svar dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, aeq(A) beq(B) var lags(1/6) exog(clinton bush alq 
embassy ep3) varconstraints(4 5) 
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irf create results6, step(12) 
irf table oirf 
 
matrix sig_var6=e(Sigma) 
matrix list sig_var6 
matrix chol_var6=cholesky(sig_var6) 
matrix list chol_var6 
 
*Varnorm 
qui var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) lags(1/6) 
varnorm 
 
 
*Varsoc 
varsoc dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) constraints(4 5) 
maxlag(15) 
qui var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) lags(1/6) 
varlmar 
qui var dAmPol dChiPol dPubOp, exog(ep3 embassy alq bush clinton) lags(1/3) 
varlmar 
 
 
*Viser likningenes residualer over tid, viser homoskedastisitet --> antyder at forholdet ikke er 
endret. 
predict rstdCHINA, residuals eq(dChiPol) 
predict rstdUSA, residuals eq(dAmPol) 
predict rstdPubOp, residuals eq(dPubOp) 
 
graph twoway scatter rstdCHINA DATE 
graph twoway scatter rstdUSA DATE 
graph twoway scatter rstdPubOp DATE 
 
 
